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INTRODUCTION
Practicing lawyers never tire of talking about hearsay and
commentators in the academy never tire of reforming it.1
Hearsay grips our attention for many reasons: In general
outline it presents the very picture of order and rationalism, a
little like the view from an airplane of the layout and arterial
patterns of a city or the checkerboard fields of a farm. On
closer inspection, however, it seems chaotic and irrational, like
noisy traffic at a congested intersection, and almost random and
accidental, like a farm seen from a country road. Hearsay is
practical and theoretical, simple and complex, accepted and
criticized. Hearsay is the place where professional cultures con-
flict: Trial lawyers do not describe themselves as hunters or
hired guns,2 but they see lawsuits as fights to be won; commen-
tators do not think trials resemble library research or labora-
tory experiments, but think they should (among other things)
find the truth, and the tension between these perspectives col-
ors the discourse about hearsay.3
Arguments about hearsay bring feelings of unease to aca-
demic commentators, 4 but the hearsay doctrine, or something
which fulfills its objectives, is necessary. Persuasive objections
to most reform proposals go beyond saying they stand little
chance of being adopted. The nub of it is that they are too sim-
1. That practitioners and commentators differ this way is no more sur-
prising than that different dogs bark differently. People who try cases worry
about understanding the system and making it work, and people who teach
and do research see problems in conventional wisdom and look for new solu-
tions. Cf. Roger C. Park, Evidence Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 849, 870 (1991) ("[I]f doctrinal scholars became more willing to support as
well as attack existing authority, that change might open the way to scholar-
ship elaborating reasons for existing law that judges themselves have not had
the leisure or specialized expertise to appreciate.").
2. But one actually does. See GERRY SPENCE & ANTHONY PoLK, GERRY
SPENCE: GUNNING FOR JUSTICE 15 (1982). This Wyoming lawyer calls himself
a hunter and suggests that fear is his motivating emotion during trial-fear of
losing, failing to protect his client, and being misunderstood by the jury.
Spence, a veritable Marlon Brando of the courtroom, resembles other lawyers
in Wyoming by wearing cowboy boots and a broad western hat, but goes fur-
ther with the look than most, adding a fringed leather jacket and longcut hair.
3. Trial judges are omitted from this description because they seem to be
reasonably at peace with existing doctrine.
4. Could it be that we love complexity because it is our bread and but-
ter? Because we are too distant from the work of courts? Because we under-
stand it and students are desperate to learn it? With each class that goes
through the rigors of learning it, are we perpetuating their devotion, increas-
ing an army of resistance against reform? Are the hearsay exceptions only a
refuge for judges who want rules they can apply without thinking hard?
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ple, too much attuned to the academic vision of rationality, and
too little attuned to the complexity of concerns underlying the
doctrine.
This Article examines what I call post-modern justifica-
tions and criticisms. It focuses on hearsay doctrine as it appears
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and pays more attention to
major themes than specific detail or local variation. In an ear-
lier day, modernists saw a few powerful concerns behind the
hearsay doctrine. They argued that these could not justify a
doctrine as complex or inhospitable to hearsay as the one we
have. They proposed simplified rules aimed at admitting more
hearsay. But the modernists did not prevail, as can be seen in
the adoption and spread of the Federal Rules, which retain the
exclusionary principle and detailed categorical exceptions.
It is too early to claim that the term "post-modern" is any-
thing more than a label describing an environment dominated
by the Rules and affected by evolving confrontation jurispru-
dence.5 There is some reason to suppose post-modernists see,
behind the hearsay doctrine, a set of justifications more elabo-
rate and nuanced than those acknowledged and criticized by
modernists, and that post-modernists are more pragmatic, less
resolutely academic in attitude, and somewhat more hospitable
to the need to test and examine hearsay.6
Part I of this Article describes the conventional modern ac-
count of hearsay and its difficulties, and modern criticisms and
reform proposals. Part II offers a post-modern defense of the
hearsay doctrine, in part replying to modern criticisms and pro-
posals and drawing much from Professor Roger Park's careful
and informative study and Professor Eleanor Swift's thoughtful
critique.7 Part III considers the substance of the Swift and
5. Several post-modernist notions contribute to a discussion of the hear-
say doctrine. These include the idea that speaking is doing, and the feeling
that the culture of ordinary people is important. Post-modernists urge people
to reflect on their cultural circumstance. For further discussion of post-mod-
ernist theory, see Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 577 (1991).
6. Commentators Roger Park and Eleanor Swift fit this description. So
do Ronald Carlson, Edward Imwinkelried, and Michael Graham, whose work
focuses largely on improving hearsay doctrine in particular areas of recurrent
difficulty. Citations to these commentators appear frequently in this Article.
7. See Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86
MCH. L. REV. 51 (1987) [hereinafter Park, Subject Matter Approach]; Eleanor
Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 U. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1987) [hereinafter
Swift, Abolishing Hearsay]; Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to
Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1339 (1987) [hereinafter Swift, Foundation Fact
Approach].
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Park post-modern reform proposals in more detail. Finally,
Part IV examines statements used indirectly to prove some act,
event, or condition apparently on the declarant's mind as he
speaks-an area in which there has been almost no evolution
between modernists and post-modernists. Here I offer my own
post-modern suggestions for an approach that may produce, if
not better results, at least a better understanding.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL MODERN ACCOUNT
OF HEARSAY
The modern and conventional account, largely accepted as
the basis of the doctrine set out in the Federal Rules, holds that
hearsay is generally excluded because it is less reliable than
live testimony.8 Live testimony is subject to trial safeguards
that expose the risks that come with taking someone's say-so as
proof of something.9 Those safeguards help the trier of fact
evaluate live testimony, but not remote statements, which the
hearsay doctrine admits through a scheme of categorical excep-
tions based on considerations of trustworthiness and necessity.
A. PARTICULAR SHORTCOMINGS
This modern conventional account has explanatory force.
Its major shortcoming is that it lacks the power to deal with
three major challenges to the hearsay doctrine.
The first and most basic challenge is to decide what hear-
say to admit and what to exclude.10 Here modern doctrine al-
8. In its note to Rule 801, the Advisory Committee cites the risks of tak-
ing human accounts as proof, naming memory, perception, narrative ability,
and candor. FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee's note.
9. In its note to Rule 801, the Advisory Committee cites the safeguards of
cross-examination, assessment of witness demeanor, and the administration of
an oath. FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee's note. Exceptions to the ex-
clusion of hearsay are allowed because certain testimony is bolstered by "cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." FED. R. Evm. 803 advisory
committee's note. Notions of necessity apparently underlie Rule 804 and the
catchall exceptions in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). See FED. R. EvID. 803(24),
804(b) advisory committee's notes. These are the same ideas Wigmore singled
out and developed as major themes. See 5 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1362, 1421-1422 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974); see also Lawrence H. Tribe,
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-69 (1974) (explaining hear-
say dangers and foundations of hearsay exceptions).
10. Although critics of the modern hearsay doctrine imply that it is im-
possible to draft categorical exceptions that work well, they do not advocate
opening the door to any and all hearsay. Even Bentham, with his blunt and
sarcastic attacks, did not think hearsay should be freely admissible. He pro-
posed a rule of preference similar to the one put forward in the Model Code of
[Vol. 76:367
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most sets itself up for the criticism that modernists such as
Edmund Morgan and John Maguire delivered in scathing
terms." Revisions in the categorical exceptions in the Federal
Rules disposed of some complaints,' 2 but not the basic attack on
the adequacy and coherence of the modern account and overall
doctrine.
The notion of trustworthiness surely does operate oddly.
For example, excited utterances are admitted because we think
that people reacting suddenly to an event cannot lie. However,
problems of perception and ambiguity crop up. Business
records are admitted because it is thought that commercial
practice and reliance on records guarantee care in preparation.
However, such records are self-serving. Need, it turns out, is a
protean concept: Sometimes it means that evidence is scarce
and we should take what we can get;' 3 sometimes it means that
the declarant is unavailable and something is better than noth-
ing,14 but his death is no guarantee that what he said will come
in; sometimes need means that we should admit out-of-court
statements, whatever their shortcomings, because live testi-
mony may be no more reliable;15 sometimes it means that live
Evidence more than a century later. See infra note 33 and accompanying text;
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 40 (1985).
11. John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System- Around and Through the
Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741, 741 (1961) [hereinafter Maguire, Through the
Thicket] (characterizing hearsay as an "unintelligible thicket"); John M.
Maguire & Edmund M. Morgan, Looking Forward and Backward at Evidence,
50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921-22 (1937) (stating that hearsay and exceptions "re-
semble an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paint-
ings by cubists, futurists, and surrealists").
12. Morgan describes a hypothetical civil case in which many items of
hearsay are offered, and argues that standard doctrine would err in selecting
which to admit and which to exclude. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreward to
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 38-47 (1942); EDMUND M. MORGAN, SOME
PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION
169-95 (1956). The categorical exceptions in the Federal Rules would change
many results in ways Morgan would appreciate, but not all. Morgan thought
that an affidavit by an eyewitness to an accident should be admitted. He also
believed that a statement by the driver to his wife should be admitted if both
declarants were dead at the time of trial. Morgan thought unavailability alone
justified admitting these statements, noting that less reliable dying declara-
tions and excited utterances by the same two people would be admitted.
13. Excited utterances admissible under Rule 803(2) illustrate this notion
in fact, if not quite in theory, since most exciting events are fleeting and hard
to prove.
14. The exceptions requiring unavailability illustrate this notion, since
Rule 804 admits some statements made by unavailable declarants.
15. The exception in Rule 803(3) for statements describing present physi-
cal or mental condition illustrates this notion, because it is doubtful that later
1992]
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testimony promises much bother and little benefit while hear-
say poses little risk.16 In short, sometimes even a strong need
for evidence does not result in admitting hearsay, while other
times a weaker need does. Neither trustworthiness nor need
explains the treatment the doctrine accords to admissions by
parties and their agents.
The second challenge is to figure out what to do with out-
of-court statements made earlier by people now giving live tes-
timony. Although these statements fit the standard hearsay
definition if offered to prove what they assert, trial safeguards
can be brought to bear. Academicians generally want to admit
these statements,' 7 lawyers want to exclude them, and the
Rules reach an uneasy compromise which produces tension and
practical difficulties.' 8
The third challenge, which is to figure out how far to ex-
tend the doctrine, really involves two questions. The one ur-
gent question is whether to accord hearsay treatment to
statements used indirectly to prove an act, event, or condition
apparently on the declarant's mind, when the statement seems
not actually to say or imply (in the strong sense of intentionally
expressing) something about such matters. On this point, many
modern critics (with the principal exception of McCormick) be-
lieved that keeping faith with theory required the broadest pos-
sible application of the doctrine. 19 Rule 801 seems to chart a
live testimony is more trustworthy than contemporaneous descriptions of
these conditions.
16. The business records exception in Rule 803(6) illustrates this notion,
for many if not most such records prove narrow points easily, and finding and
calling a live knowledgeable witness would be difficult.
17. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTON TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
203-04 (2d ed. 1987); CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1972); 3A
WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1018.
18. Rule 801(d)(1) allows the court to admit, for all purposes, certain
statements of a testifying declarant, who is then subject to cross-examination
on those statements. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1). Statements admitted under this
rule include inconsistent statements given under oath in a proceeding, consis-
tent statements offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper mo-
tive, and statements identifying someone the declarant has seen. All of these
exceptions present serious line-drawing problems, and stop far short of cover-
ing every prior statement by testifying witnesses.
19. See Ted Finman, Implied Assertions As Hearsay: Some Criticisms of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682, 691-93, 708 (1962) (argu-
ing that nonassertive conduct offered for the two-step inference of belief,
hence fact believed, should be treated as hearsay, as should statements offered
to prove unspoken beliefs, and proposing an exception allowing the judge to
admit such evidence upon concluding that cross-examination would not be
helpful); Maguire, Through The Thicket, supra note 11, at 768-73 (proposing an
[Vol. 76:367
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middle ground, but courts seize on broad and narrow readings
and seem unable to locate that ground. The other question is
whether to extend the doctrine to conduct lacking assertive
quality when offered for the familiar two-step inference, as
proof of what the actor thinks happened, hence as proof of
what actually happened. Here Rule 801 requires nonhearsay
treatment,20 but this issue and the prior one are more closely
connected than post-modernists recognize.
B. MODERN CRITICSMs
Modem attacks usually make four powerful points. First,
the hearsay doctrine excludes probative evidence. Critics point
out that most of us routinely. rely on the reported say-so of
others in our daily lives, not only in matters of little conse-
quence but in serious personal and business matters.2 ' Critics
note that hearsay admitted without objection can support a ver-
elaborate definition and arguing that orders or instructions offered as evidence
of unspoken "factual determinations" have "hearsay quality"). Morgan was
strongly convinced that hearsay treatment is warranted for statements offered
to prove unspoken beliefs. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-hear-
say, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1138, 1158-60 (1935) (proposing an exception that would
admit some such assertions on proof of elements of reliance by the declarant).
Almost alone among modern critics, McCormick thought assertive utterances
should be classified as nonhearsay on the basis of performative aspects. See
Charles T. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 496-503
(1930) (recognizing performative aspects of words, such as an offer of employ-
ment as evidence of the offeree's skill, and doubting that the question should
be resolved purely on the basis that "the conduct is verbal or non-verbal").
Part IV of this Article offers additional suggestions, as well as descriptions of
post-modern views of this topic.
20. It is not necessary to revisit the question whether Baron Parke was
correct in taking the opposite position in the classic Wright v. Tatham, 112
Eng. Rep. 488 (1837). I support the position taken by the framers of Rule 801,
and think Parke was wrong to call nonassertive conduct hearsay, and wrong to
describe it as an "implied assertion." To give him his due, he was astute to
notice that "hearsay risks" accompany the use of conduct to prove belief,
hence the fact believed. However, the question whether the hearsay doctrine
should apply is another matter altogether.
21. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L.
REV. 331, 344-46 (1961) [hereinafter Weinstein, Probative Force] (listing the
critics); Charles T. McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the American
Law Institute, 20 TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (1942) (explaining that business could
come "to a standstill" if the hearsay rule applied out of court); Jack B. Wein-
stein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, Address Before the Annual
Advocacy Institute (Nov. 17, 1967), in 44 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1968) (asserting that
the hearsay rule was developed by "upper-class English judges" who were
"contemptuous of lower class illiterates who sat as jurors," but that modern
jurors can assess the probative force of hearsay "under some guidance from
the court").
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dict, even if a proper objection would require exclusion,22 and
they say courts can profit from the experience of decision-mak-
ing bodies that admit hearsay freely.23
Second, today's jurors are well educated. Critics point out
that the hearsay doctrine evolved long before mass communica-
tion and universal public schooling, and claim modern jurors
are sophisticated enough to evaluate hearsay. In their exper-
iences in life, the argument runs, jurors acquire an understand-
ing far more discerning than the simple tests courts apply in
excluding hearsay.2 4 Admitting more hearsay, rather than ex-
cluding as much as we do, will result in fewer mistakes. After
all, juries decide cases of great moment on the merits, choosing
between conflicting stories, allowing or denying the recovery of
great sums, and putting accused people in prison or back into
the community. In trusting juries with such important tasks
while keeping hearsay from them, we seem to swallow the
camel and strain at the gnat.
Third, critics argue that some categorical exceptions make
little sense, and lead to mistakes both in what they admit and
in what they exclude. Here the most frequent targets are the
exceptions for excited utterances and dying declarations,2 and,
to some extent, the state-of-mind exception.2 6 In addition, crit-
22. See United States v. Hall, 845 F.2d 1281, 1283 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
488 U.S. 860 (1988); Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349, 1356
(5th Cir. 1983); Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 1373 (C.C.P.A. 1982); United
States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1026 (Former 5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982), and cert denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982). Simply because of simi-
lar decisions counting excludable hearsay in assessing sufficiency (no objection
having been made), Morgan concluded that the main purpose of the doctrine
was to protect parties rather than to express distrust of factfinders. See Ed-
mund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Con-
cept, 62 HARv. L. REV. 177, 183-84 (1948).
23. Weinstein, Probative Force, supra note 21, at 347-49 (citing worker's
compensation, administrative and grand jury proceedings, court hearings on
warrants, and sentencing proceedings as examples of litigation not bound by
hearsay rules).
24. Swift, Foundation Fact Approach, supra note 7, at 1363 (arguing that
the general knowledge of jurors "is superior to the categorical generalizations
drafted by the judges and legislators").
25. See infra note 39 (citing sources presenting criticisms of excited utter-
ances and dying declarations).
26. There are three major criticisms of the state-of-mind exception. One
is that it embraces self-serving statements. See United States v. Torres, 901
F.2d 205, 239-40 (2d Cir.) (holding that the court lacks discretion to exclude
statement within state-of-mind exception as untrustworthy), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 273 (1990); United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1984)
(same). Another criticism is that the exception supposes hearsay is the best
evidence of state of mind, but many statements admitted under the exception
[Vol. 76:367
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ics routinely claim it makes no sense to limit the use of prior
statements by testifying witnesses to impeachment or repair.
It is true that anyone who looks at the array of exceptions
from outside the profession will think them odd. Try to imag-
ine, for instance, setting out good rules to advise someone we
care for who needs instruction-in the manner, for instance, of
a father advising his daughter. Who would tell a daughter to
sort out second-hand statements by applying the tests embed-
ded in the hearsay exceptions--"trust what you're told an ex-
cited man said," for example, because "excited men don't lie"?
In ordinary life, after all, we always pay more attention to par-
ticulars and draw on a lifetime of experience in assessing the
reported say-so of others. We are more likely to advise others
to take into account the character, background and track record
of the person whose statement is reported, and to think about
what she has at stake, how well she understands the world, and
what kinds of ideas she usually brings to conversations. In con-
trast, the hearsay exceptions focus on a few factors that only
begin to touch the question of reliability 27
Fourth, the doctrine is complicated and hard to apply.
Even when its meaning is clear, other doctrines governing im-
peachment and expert testimony may require that a statement
be admitted for limited nonhearsay purposes, or for nonhearsay
uses (like effect on listener), despite the real risk that a
factfinder cannot make the required distinction. 28 Similarly,
are used to prove later conduct by the declarant, for which better evidence
may well be available. A third criticism is that it is hard to prevent the excep-
tion from being used to prove facts remembered and the behavior of others.
On the latter points, it is worth noting that a statement describing future pur-
pose is likely to be at least as persuasive in proving the fact motivating the de-
clarant as in proving what she then did. See United States v. Annunziato, 293
F.2d 373, 377-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961). It is also worth not-
ing that modern cases often permit use of the exception to prove conduct by
another if independent evidence connects declarant to the one whose behavior
is in question. See, e.g., United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988). See generally Eustace Seligman,
An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146, 157 (1912) (asserting
that admitting a statement to prove future act leads to admitting it to prove
prior event, thus destroying hearsay rule).
27. See Swift, Foundation Fact Approach, supra note 7, at 1363 (stating
that "because of their broad and abstract nature," hearsay exceptions "cannot
correspond with any more than a low degree of probability to the conclusions
they assert about reality, which is concrete and full of detail").
28. See Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limita-
tions on Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 234,
246-47 (1984) (asserting that only cross-examiners should be allowed to intro-
duce hearsay underlying expert testimony); Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the
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hearsay exceptions sometimes allow use of a statement for one
purpose but not another. The state-of-mind exception presents
an example.29 Sometimes one part of a statement satisfies an
exception while another does not (as happens with outsider
statements against penal interest offered against the accused).3 0
Certainly no one who studies or teaches evidence doubts that
the hearsay doctrine is hard to apply and administer.
It may be impossible to say whether the doctrine pays for
itself, although some empirical work is now under way. One
strong critic believes (or once did) that the doctrine effects at
least some savings because it is cheaper to test witnesses in
court than prepare and offer evidence bearing on the credibility
of remote declarants.31 Moreover, the doctrine may save trial
time when it excludes evidence for which no substitute is of-
fered. But arguably the doctrine is costly to the extent that it
forces proponents to call and examine witnesses rather than of-
fer reports of what they say.3 2
C. MODERN REFORM PROPOSALS
The hearsay doctrine could easily be simplified in either of
two ways. It could be cast as a rule of preference for live testi-
mony, supplemented by categorical exceptions. For example,
hearsay would be admissible if the declarant testifies or is un-
available; if he is available but uncalled, his statement would
be excluded unless it fits a categorical exception.33 Arguably
Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REv. 577, 585 (1986) (arguing
against the "wholesale" admission of hearsay underlying expert opinion when
the hearsay is offered by the party presenting the expert).
29. See supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1978) (part of
statement by alleged co-offender was properly admitted as against his interest,
but not the part implicating the defendant directly).
31. Weinstein, Probative Force, supra note 21, at 336 (discussing cross-ex-
amination and stating that a lawyer relies to some extent on "trial observation,
hints from his client or expert, and what he believes about the witness's back-
ground and the facts of the case," which permits "cheaper preparation and a
shorter trial" than open admissibility of hearsay would allow).
32. Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 65 (stating that trial
examination of declarant "may take longer than would introduction of an out-
of-court statement").
33. The Model Code of Evidence took this approach. Under Rule 503,
hearsay would be admitted if the declarant testifies or is unavailable. MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503 (1942). Hearsay would be excluded if the declar-
ant can be brought to court but is not, unless the statement fits an exception
on a fairly standard list, including admissions, excited utterances, declarations
against interest and business records. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules
502-29 (1942).
[Vol. 76:367
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the conventional account more comfortably fits such a doctrine
than the one we have. Trial safeguards would operate when a
declarant appears, unavailability shows need, and categorical
exceptions would admit trustworthy and needed hearsay. Al-
ternatively, the hearsay doctrine could function as a broad ex-
clusionary principle subject to a general exception directing
courts to admit trustworthy statements. A notice provision
could satisfy the perennial objection that this approach makes
it impossible for lawyers to prepare for trial.
In the last fifty years, these approaches have proved politi-
cally unsalable. The framers of the Model Code learned as
much when their rule of preference got nowhere, and the fram-
ers of the original Uniform Rules fared little better with a mod-
ified rule of preference.1 The framers of the Federal Rules
first proposed broad-gauged exceptions in language favoring ad-
missibility backed by a list of exceptions cast as examples or il-
lustrations.35 However, under pressure they retreated to
categorical exceptions backed by catchall provisions. Congress
would not swallow even this much reform,36 so the drafters ad-
ded to the catchall provisions not only a notice requirement,
but unintelligible conditions designed to discourage their use.37
34. Under Rule 63(1) of the original Uniform Rules of Evidence, hearsay
would be admitted if the declarant appeared. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953). If
the declarant was unavailable or available but uncalled, his statement would
be admissible only if it fit a categorical exception on a standard list. Some of
the exceptions required unavailability. Id.
35. The Preliminary Draft of March, 1969, would have paved the way to
admit hearsay "if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was
made offer assurances of accuracy." FED. R. Evin. 8-03(a) (Preliminary Draft
1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969). For unavailable declarants, satis-
fying that criterion was enough under proposed Rule 8-04(a). See FED. R.
EVID. 8-04(a) (Preliminary Draft 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. at 377. For an
available declarant, that criterion sufficed under proposed Rule 8-03(a) if the
court was satisfied that accuracy was "not likely to be enhanced" by calling
the declarant. See FED. R. EvID. 8-03(a) (Preliminary Draft 1969), reprinted in
46 F.R.D. at 345, 377.
36. See 4 DAvID W. LOUISELL & CHRIsToPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE §§ 437, 485 (1980) (giving an account of the rulemaking and legislative
processes leading to the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804).
37. Under Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the proponent must, among other
things, show that the hearsay is "more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence" reasonably available. FED. R. EVID. 803(24),
804(b)(5). See generally Randolph A. Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay
Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial Guarantees of Trust-
worthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 431 (1985)
(analyzing judicial interpretations of the residual exceptions in cases consider-
ing the admissibility of grand jury testimony); David A. Sonenshein, The
Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of
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D. EmIRmICIsM AND EMBARRASSMENT
The central premise of the hearsay doctrine is that live tes-
timony is preferable to remote statements. This premise and
the corollary that juries cannot properly appraise remote state-
ments are largely unsupported by empirical evidence. In the
absence of such evidence, some commentators seek to demon-
strate, more or less ontologically, that courts would be wise to
admit more hearsay.38 Others combine empirical data with ar-
guments from common experience in attacking the reliability
of statements admitted under the exceptions for excited utter-
ances and dying declarations. 39 Still, the absence of more ex-
tensive empirical evidence has proved to be a great
embarrassment, at least to academic commentators. Practition-
ers seem far less troubled by the situation.
Commentators may soon present more empirical evidence,
along with more doctrinal argument borrowing insights of so-
cial scientists. It is fair to say that what we have so far is a
mixed picture. Some empirical data arguably support the claim
that jurors can evaluate hearsay. For example, in videotaped
trial reenactments and experiments using a scene from a mo-
tion picture, undergraduate students apparently did not highly
value hearsay; nor did people drawn from jury arrays who read
a fictional trial transcript.40 As the pioneers in this area are the
a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982) (stating that courts have not used the
catchall exceptions as intended and disagree about their meaning).
38. See Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 609, 621-28 (1974) (stating that the expected error from admitting
hearsay is minor, so hearsay should be admitted unless the jury is likely to as-
sign it at least twice its true weight, because otherwise the effect of error is
larger in excluding than admitting the evidence).
39. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 436-38 (1928) (citing experimental
data supporting the proposition that emotion lessens the impulse to lie but im-
pairs perception); Leonard R. Jaffee, The Constitution and Proof by Dead or
Unconfrontable Declarants, 33 ARK. L. REV. 227, 308-63 (1979) (concluding
that psychiatric, psychological, experimental, statistical, medical and physical
evidence "seems negative, unsupportive, ambiguous, or insignificant" when of-
fered in support of the dying declaration exception and recommending its abo-
lition); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism
of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 28 (stating that excitement is no guarantee of truthfulness and distorts
perception and memory, especially when a witness observes "a nonroutine, ep-
isodic event" such as a collision or a crime).
40. Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720 (1992) (discussing the responses
of undergraduate students in an experiment employing a scene from "Anat-
omy of a Murder"); Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay:
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first to acknowledge, however, controlling the experiments and
using them in the project of hearsay reform present enormous
challenges, and much work remains to be done.4'
It is important, for instance, that experimental statements
describe real events about which "the truth" is independently
known, for otherwise it is impossible to say whether jurors
properly appraised such statements. Designers of experiments
have found it very hard to avoid or factor out other influences
on perceptions of mock jurors, such as the credibility or appeal
of reporting witnesses, the effect of opening and closing state-
ments, and the relative proportion of hearsay to other proof.
Also, it is hard to know whether experimental subjects mirror
real jury arrays, to estimate whether observed outcomes in one
setting would hold true in another (e.g., alleged murder versus
automobile accidents), and to extrapolate from individual reac-
tions to the group dynamics of jury decisionmaking or from one
jury to another.
Some empirical data arguably support the hearsay doctrine.
Motivation apparently affects the ability to evaluate conflicting
evidence and to overcome distractions from affective reactions
and the way evidence is packaged.42 People more naturally re-
call and concentrate on message content than source informa-
tion, and take greater care in assessing the latter when it is
elaborate.43 Hence there is some reason to suppose that limit-
A Preliminary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Ev-
idence in American Courts, 15 LAW & PsYcHOL. REV. 65 (1991) (discussing an
actual jury array reading a fictional transcript); Peter Miene et al., Juror Deci-
sion Making and The Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683,
691 (1992) (discussing the responses of undergraduate students in an experi-
ment utilizing videotaped events).
41. See Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay
Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 655, 658-64 (1992) (describing the difficulties of researching the effect of
hearsay on jurors' decision making).
42. When people are highly motivated and able to process arguments,
"strong arguments are more effective than weak ones despite the presence of
peripheral cues" such as source credibility or attractiveness. When people are
not highly motivated, a peripheral factor such as attractiveness may act as a
"simple positive cue." RICHARD E. PEr= & JOHN T. CAcioppo, CoMMUNICA-
TION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATrTIUDE 205
(1986).
43. See Marcia K. Johnson, Discriminating the Origin of Information, in
THOMAS F. OLTMANNS & BRENDAN A. MAHER, DELUSIONAL BELIEFS 34, 40-41
(1988) (stating that people may "confuse the origin of information, misattribut-
ing to perception something that was only imagined" or confusing information
from one source with information from another; and genuine memories may
be recognized by the presence of more knowledge of perceptual detail, such as
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hmg source information encourages more attention to message
content, and that hearsay evidence may discourage attention to
important matters of source credibility-in short, that
factfinders do not evaluate hearsay as well as live testimony.
While there is some indication that demeanor evidence does not
help factfinders in assessing honesty (it may actually mislead
people), apparently verbal content is very helpful," which sug-
gests that live questioning, which is useful in exposing and ex-
ploring problems stemming from narrative ambiguity and
memory,45 is also useful in assessing veracity (though not be-
cause demeanor helps).
What is the right response to the scarcity of empirical
data? I suggest two points. First, this shortage is not reason
enough to abandon or extensively revise hearsay doctrine, even
if we emphasize accurate factfinding as the important value.4
Experimental data may prove valuable, but probably will not
produce direct or persuasive proof that factfinders (judge or
jury) decide actual cases correctly or appraise actual hearsay ac-
curately. Mock-empirical claims (the doctrine works well be-
cause the system does) deserve little weight, but attempts by
judges to sift hearsay and by codifiers to embody and some-
times improve the resulting insights are entitled to some
weight.
Second, the lack of empirical data does not distinguish
hearsay from other important law. The hearsay doctrine draws
on at least as much common sense and careful thought as, for
color and sound, and more information about time, place, and detail); see also
Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Involvement and Persuasion: Tradition
Versus Integration, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 367, 368 (1990) (summarizing studies
on the effects of personal involvement on factors that affect persuasion).
44. See Olin Guy Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1087-
88, 1100 (1991) (describing experimental data indicating that nonverbal cues
such as facial expression and tone of voice do not help observers detect decep-
tion, but noting the importance of verbal content in evaluating veracity); see
also Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1988, at 243, 262-64 (describing the same
data).
45. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in
Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt-
And Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REv. 215 (1989) (describing memory factor
and its importance to the application of the categorical exceptions).
46. However important may be the appearance of getting facts right, actu-
ally getting them right seems still more important. I agree that "a theory of
operational accuracy should underlie evidence rules." See Swift, Foundation
Fact Approach, supra note 7, at 1361-62. Of course, judgments and underlying
factual findings are sometimes value laden, so accuracy may capture less of
what is meant than rightness or correctness.
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example, strict liability in tort. Strict liability came from theo-
ries about loss spreading and accident avoidance that were un-
tested when the doctrine took hold. These theories produce
continuing debate that is as extensive, vigorous, and empirically
unverified as the discussion of hearsay.47 The point is not that
we should accept doctrine uncritically, or that we should ignore
empirical evidence, but that experience and reason are ade-
quate bases for hearsay doctrine.
II. POST-MODERN ACCOUNTS
Post-modernists take pragmatic approaches to hearsay is-
sues, arriving at more moderate positions than earlier reform-
ers and defenders of conventional doctrine. In the process they
suggest important arguments and new twists on conventional
arguments that merit comment and reflection, and raise impor-
tant questions.
A. CONVENTIONAL ARGUMENTS REVISITED
The best conventional argument against hearsay is that it is
47. Modern notions that manufacturers should pay for injuries stemming
from product use can be traced to Justice Traynor's famous concurring opinion
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944). But the
soundness of tort doctrine that in effect tells manufacturers to charge an in-
surance premium in the price of their products is largely untested and open to
considerable doubt. Modern commentators disagree on the appropriate sub-
stantive standard for such cases. Compare RICHARD A. POsNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.5 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that a negligence theory is prefer-
able to a strict liability theory because the system cannot and should not en-
courage producers to take more precautions than are cost effective) with
Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73
CAL. L. REV. 677, 713-14 (1985) (arguing that imposing a strict liability stan-
dard on auto makers and common carriers "creates the maximum incentive
for capable and attentive decisionmakers to select efficient cost-minimizing
choices" and "encourages problem-solving injurers to protect victims against
losses resulting from their own foreseeable careless behavior").
There are growing doubts as to the capacity of the tort system to achieve
its compensatory goal or properly manage social risk. See, e.g., Peter Huber,
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 278 (1985) (arguing that courts cannot engage
in the "aggregative calculus of risk created and risk averted that progressive
public-risk management requires"); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1550-60 (1987) (pointing out
the regressive nature of accident insurance sold as part of the price of a prod-
uct and criticizing the use of this device as a loss spreading technique); Ste-
phen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 664
(1985) (asserting that tort law fails to compensate at acceptable costs and fails
to do justice to either plaintiffs or defendants).
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untested by cross-examination, and the objection of modern re-
formers is that juries can properly evaluate hearsay.
These competing claims are not as far apart as they seem.
After all, conventional doctrine allows vast quantities of hear-
say to be admitted, so it certainly does not imply a belief that
juries cannot deal with hearsay. Writing tongue-in-cheek but
with serious purpose, one reformer argued that a good reason
to scrap the doctrine is that most hearsay is eventually admit-
ted.48 Even an ardent critic of conventional hearsay doctrine
agrees that live testimony is preferable to remote statements.49
Modern reformers should also have recognized that a rule of
free admissibility would pave the way for partisan statements
proved by proxy witnesses, statements of unknown. origin, and
statements made under extraordinary pressure or other cir-
cumstances almost certain to distort. Broad admissibility of
hearsay would have a negative impact on important procedural
mechanisms and invite fabrication of statements that would be
hard to detect.50
The point of the conventional argument is not that state-
ments are unreliable unless cross-examined, which truly would
be preposterous, but that factfinders-judges and juries alike,
but especially juries-lack what they need to evaluate most un-
tested statements. Those that are admitted under categorical
exceptions are thought to be trustworthy even though the
factfinder lacks what the testing process provides. Although
Americans are used to the idea that only juries need protection
from hearsay, a contemporary study reports that early conti-
nental legal traditions, in the setting of factfinding by judges,
48. Irving Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C. L.
REV. 281, 292 (1980). Preliminary indications from a confined survey of cases
suggest that much hearsay is in fact excluded. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay
Rule at Work- Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76
MINN. L. REV. 473 (1992).
49. Weinstein, Probative Force, supra note 21, at 334-35 (stating that both
lawyers and jurors think that jurors can better assess witness credibility with
demeanor evidence and cross-examination, and arguing that if this preference
for live testimony gives triers of fact "more assurance" and conveys a "sense of
fairness" to litigants and the public, we are justified in acting on this basis, ab-
sent proof of error).
50. For post-modern recognition of these points, see Swift, Abolishing
Hearsay, supra note 7, at 498-99, 507, 513-14 (discussing "abstract declarants"
about whom the factfinder knows little, "risky declarants," such as claimants
who make self-serving statements, and "burden-shifting declarants" whose
statements prevent grant of summary judgment); see also Park, Subject Matter
Approach, supra note 7, at 63 (arguing that free admissibility of hearsay would
impede pretrial dismissal of weak cases and encourage "jury lawlessness").
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developed rules relating to hearsay. Such conventions appear
in Roman-canon law as early as the Thirteenth Century.5 1
Whatever one might say about jury sophistication and uni-
versal education, the objection that juries can perform well
without the benefit of demeanor evidence and cross-examina-
tion is itself suspect, for two reasons. First, common experience
suggests that people prefer first-hand information on serious
matters. Of course we rely on second-hand statements, but
only selectively, and we prefer the say-so of people we know
and trust, and people who know something about the matter in
question. When we decide whom to believe in everyday life, we
do so on the basis of particular information. We assess the
motivations and capacities of people in familiar settings on the
basis of character, interest, and track record, as well as our esti-
mate of their viewpoints, understanding and judgment. Usually
in everyday life we have an option not open to factfinders,
which is to do nothing (reserving decision until matters seem
more certain) or to change course when further information
comes to light.52
Second, few everyday decisions bear any resemblance to
the decisions factfinders make in lawsuits. Rarely do ordinary
people decide issues as momentous as whether large sums
should change hands or someone should go to jail. Rarely do
ordinary people choose between sharply disputed versions of
facts and responsibility. Most parents or business people know
how hard it is to resolve conflicting accounts of events unseen.
Rarely are people in ordinary life directed to decide important
questions based on facts presented by advocates in a confined
time and unfamiliar setting. Ordinary people have little or no
exposure to the forces that operate during litigation, and the
ways these forces affect statements collected with an eye to-
ward trial, and little or no familiarity with the most common
51. Mirjan Damaka, Of Hearsay and its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REv. 425,
434 & n.21 (1992) (reporting that Roman-canon law developed rules requiring
corroboration of hearsay, essentially treating the problem as a matter relating
to the sufficiency of evidence, and occasionally excluding hearsay from
consideration).
52. See Damaka, supra note 51, at 444. Damalka contrasts the Anglo-
American party-dominated system of gathering and presenting evidence in a
compressed "day-in-court" trial with the continental form of methodical, un-
hurried, piecemeal proceedings in which the court usually has time to seek out
the hearsay declarant and examine him. In the former setting, excluding
hearsay is a more attractive option than it is in the latter setting. The article
also notes that factual findings are more readily attacked on appeal in the con-
tinental system, which makes it less attractive to exclude evidence originally.
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kinds of litigation-producing events, from crimes to collisions to
toxic or defective products.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLEXITY
Emphasizing cross-examination alone as the basis for in-
sisting on live testimony and excluding hearsay is, as Park ably
argues, too reductionist.5 3 A single reason or compact argu-
ment simply cannot explain a doctrine as vast and complicated
as the hearsay doctrine.
Armed with this insight, Park suggests that the reduction-
ist explanation falls short when it comes to the conventional
treatment of prior inconsistent statements (admissible to im-
peach but not as substantive evidence), where the declarant is
available for cross-examination and the factfinder can accept or
reject the testimony based on what it sees in court. There are
other justifications, he says, including concerns about surprise
at trial, concocted or exaggerated statements, and the use of
trained investigators to exact statements by trickery and offers
of immunity or lenience. A respected federal judge expressed
similar concerns when the Rules were before Congress.5
There is also a kind of reductionism in the neat recitation
of the four hearsay risks, as though each were separate from
the other. Candor, perception, and memory obviously affect
narration, and each of the factors tends to overlap with
others.5 5 The terms themselves, although helpful to students
53. Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 77 (attacking "reduc-
tionist explanations" such as the "untested declarant" basis for excluding
hearsay).
54. Judge Friendly objected "strongly" that the proposal to allow free use
of prior inconsistent statements would let the government put on an agent
"who testifies to a statement, even an oral statement," for which there is "no
proof except the agent's own testimony," which then becomes "affirmative evi-
dence against the defendant." See Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the
House Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter Reform
Hearings], reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, LEGISLATrVE HIs-
TORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 252 (James F. Bailey, III & Oscar M. Trel-
les, II eds., 1980) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES]. Other individuals made
similar objections. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463
Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [herein-
after 5463 Hearings] (statement of Herbert Semmel made on behalf of the
Washington Council of Lawyers), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES,
supra, at 301-04; Letter from Frederick D. McDonald to Representative Wil-
liam L. Hungate (Feb. 5,1973), in Reform Hearings, supra, reprinted in 3 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORIEs, supra, at 244.
55. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Q: What Happened to the Last Genera-
tion of Reformers? (Sept. 6, 1991) (unpublished paper delivered at the Confer-
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and analysts, mask almost as much as they reveal. By percep-
tion, for instance, we mean far more than the ability to tell
green from blue, male from female. We mean discernment or
judgment as well-for instance, the ability to distinguish one
person from another, to comprehend what is important to a
lawsuit in the larger scene that the speaker observed, and to
understand complicated physical and human interactions. By
candor, we mean not only the risk of out-and-out lying, but the
infinite gradations of attitude between purposeful deception
and mild sympathy for a party or viewpoint that shades human
reactions. Even our talk of narrative ambiguity is multi-dimen-
sional, reaching not only the risk that the speaker may use
words in a peculiar way, but the risk that the trier may misun-
derstand even the best words, and the risk that even the best
words may fail to capture some point of importance or may sug-
gest something that is wrong or misleading.
Reductionist explanations also fail to account for the ad-
missions doctrine. For personal admissions, I think the best ac-
count stresses the adversary tradition, the fact that the
declarant is there to explain himself, and the fact that many
admissions are trustworthy because they are against interest
(though this.element is not required). 6 Organizational admis-
sions and coconspirator statements are admitted for very differ-
ent reasons.5 7 Other commentators stress different points or
suggest reform,58 and some object that invoking the adversary
ence on Hearsay Reform at the University of Minnesota) (criticizing Morgan's
account of the four factors as reductionist and commenting that circumstances
"might produce varying degrees of attentiveness to accuracy in recollection
and narration," hence that even if cross-examination fails to reveal falsehood,
"the very solemnity of the occasion may produce an attitude toward accuracy
of utterance that is difficult to disassemble into sincerity, narration, and mem-
ory, but which nonetheless improves the quality of the evidence").
56. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 423.
57. The better explanation for admitting most organizational admissions
is that they are as likely to be true as the next best alternative, which is live
testimony given after the witness is subjected to the pressures his employer
can bring to bear. See id. § 426. The better explanation for admitting cocon-
spirator statements is that most have performative aspects that make them
critical. However, in the end the exception is so flawed that some further
showing of trustworthiness should be required insofar as they are admitted to
prove what they assert. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-96 (1986);
Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Asser-
tion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 388 (1984).
58. See Edward R. Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions-An Estoppel,
26 U. CIN. L. REV. 17 (1957) (estoppel theory); John S. Strahorn, A Reconsider-
ation of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 484 (1937) (ad-
missions as conduct); see also Freda F. Bein, Parties' Admissions, Agents'
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tradition begs the question.5 9 Park says admissions do not bring
problems of surprise or unfettered discretion and that worries
over abuse of government power are met in criminal cases by
constitutional doctrines. 60 Whatever the explanation, the tradi-
tion of admitting statements made by the adversary cannot be
explained by reference to trustworthiness or necessity.
Park is right to protest that reductionist explanations fall
short in accounting for many aspects of hearsay. Prior inconsis-
tent statements present but a single compelling example of
broader concerns, of which three seem most worthy of note.
First, the hearsay doctrine must accommodate both the
scholar's view of trials as a search for truth and the practi-
tioner's view of trials as drama and battle. We should look at
each argument in its strongest light. Scholars say the party
hurt by an inconsistent out-of-court statement can test it and
that the truth may be found in what the witness said before,
not what he says now. The declarant is in court and friendly,
or at worst neutral, and since his position conflicts with or dif-
fers from the one he took before, he is willing to explain what
has changed. Practitioners say cross-examination can expose
falsehood and error in live testimony, but not in prior state-
ments. The witness may be friendly or neutral, and the lawyer
cannot come at him full bore as an enemy in an attempt to
Admissions: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 393, 450
(1984) (arguing that personal and representative admissions should be treated
as hearsay, but should be admitted unless doing so "would defeat the purposes
of these rules or the interests of justice").
59. See Bein, supra note 58, at 419; Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra
note 7, at 81. There is force in the objection, and Morgan's invocation of the
adversary tradition (a party "can hardly object" that he was not under oath or
cross-examined when he made the statement offered against him) was perhaps
connected with his opinion that the purpose of the hearsay doctrine is to pro-
tect parties. See 2 EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 266
(Joint Comm. on Continuing Legal Educ. of the Am. Law Inst. and the Am.
Bar Ass'n, 2d ed. 1961).
In reply to the objection that invoking the adversary tradition begs the
question, I would suggest that the same notion of individual responsibility that
holds each party to what he says and does in court in bringing or defending an
action also holds each party to what he says and does out of court. This is the
case so long as the statements and actions are relevant and not excludable for
extrinsic policy reasons. This approach seems commensurate with one pur-
pose of courts in resolving suits, which is to determine personal accountability.
60. See Roger Park, The Rationale of Personal Admissions, 21 IND. L.
REV. 509, 517-18 (1988); Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 81.
But Park also argues that process-based concerns explain the rejection as
hearsay of many other statements. Id. at 55-68. As a result, I am less comfort-
able about saying that the Constitution is the only place that can give expres-
sion to such concerns in the setting of admissions.
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burst the balloon of credibility, but must find a way to deflate
the prior statement while leaving the live testimony intact,
floating above the fray.
The visions of both scholars and practitioners are impor-
tant and compelling, and together they should shape the hear-
say doctrine. The scholar's view has great force despite the
objection that truth is often culturally-loaded and contextual,
because courts search for it and we put our faith in an adver-
sary system as the best mechanism to find it. The practitioner's
view has great force too, even though lawyers are judicial of-
ficers who are not supposed to offer false evidence or know-
ingly mislead, because we depend on lawyers not only to bring
out the truth but to convince the trier of fact. The hearsay doc-
trine must accommodate both visions, and the accommodation
cannot be entirely satisfying because the underlying tension
cannot be entirely dispelled. Practitioners have largely won the
argument over prior inconsistent statements because their view
prevailed over the academic view in Congress. 6'
Second, hearsay issues are often directly connected with
broad questions of balance and fairness. The hearsay doctrine
makes it hard for prosecutors and defense attorneys to deal
with pertinent out-of-court statements by people who will not
reiterate them at trial. For prosecutors, the problem is the
61. In reference to the proposal to admit prior inconsistent statements for
all purposes, Senator Ervin spoke for the bar when he said he would "throw
this thing on the scrap heap of injustice." His ensuing exchange with Ed
Cleary is a classic collision between the bar and the academy. When Cleary,
speaking for the academy, argued that the declarant is "in open court" and
"under oath" and "subject to cross-examination," Ervin for the bar retorted
that the proposal would let a jury "find beyond a reasonable doubt in a crimi-
nal case that this man told the truth when he was not sworn but told a lie
when he was under oath." See 5463 Hearings, supra note 54, reprinted in 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, supra note 54, at 51.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) classifies only a few types of prior
statements as nonhearsay. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1). However, it remains to
be seen whether practitioners can take comfort in the congressional pro-
nouncement that the Rule addresses only the admissibility of those few prior
inconsistent statements whose use as substantive evidence is authorized. See
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory committee's note. Congress concluded
that some prior inconsistent statements may be used substantively, but that
courts might conclude that standing alone they are insufficient to carry the
day. In addressing mainly the problem of using prior statements against the
accused, the Senate Judiciary Committee commented that Rule 801(d)(1)(A)
addresses only "admissibility" and not "sufficiency," and that if a prior state-
ment was the only evidence produced to prove a crucial point, "circumstances
could well arise" in which a court should dismiss the case. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A) report of senate committee on the judiciary.
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turncoat witness who accuses the defendant but later waffles,
commonly out of fear or regret. Prosecutors try to protect wit-
nesses from defense threats or pressure by keeping their state-
ments under wraps, but these efforts may be ineffectual (the
accused and those behind him may know who the enemies are
as the proceedings go forward). Thus, a rule authorizing use of
such statements as substantive evidence is valuable. For de-
fendants, a rule authorizing use of informal confessions is like-
wise valuable because third parties rarely repeat in court the
confessions they make informally. Both prosecutors and de-
fendants received some relief from hearsay limitations in the
Federal Rules, although prosecutors fared better than
defendants.62
Third, hearsay issues connect with process-based concerns,
a point that has special application to prior inconsistent state-
ments. The compromise lets federal prosecutors offer prior tes-
timony by turncoat witnesses, but not station house affidavits
and statements, reflecting concern over the government's ap-
proach to criminal cases. Although defendants sometimes in-
timidate witnesses who cooperate with the government,
prosecutors and police also put pressure on the same witnesses
when they are subject to related charges or parole revocation
(as is often true). The defense bar and some theorists complain
that the compromise is wrong because the same pressures that
affect affidavits also affect sworn testimony by government wit-
nesses, particularly grand jury testimony given without fear of
defense cross-examination. The refusal to go the full distance
and let in all prior inconsistent statements, as the Court and
Committee proposed, reflects process-based concerns.
The point about reductionism also applies to modern criti-
cisms of the hearsay exceptions. It is not surprising that they
provide little insight that a father could use in advising a
daughter about separating the wheat from the chaff of remote
statements, for the exceptions reflect problems in lawsuits, not
62. Lobbyists for both the prosecutors and the defense bar participated in
the rulemaking and legislative processes that produced the Rules. While there
is no reason to believe either side played pressure politics, there is also no rea-
son to suppose arms-length bargaining between equals would produce the re-
sults we see. For example, if the defense bar had foreseen that admitting
statements against penal interest would prove valuable to prosecutors, it is
likely that many more objections would have been raised. See, e.g., United
States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626, 632-33 (2d Cir.) (finding that a statement by the
defendant's sister, implicating the defendant, was properly admitted against
him under the against interest exception), cert denied, 447 U.S. 926 (1980).
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human experience generally. Nor is it surprising that an ac-
count of the exceptions that stresses only a few factors drifts
between description and prescription, or that tradition does not
conform to rationalist theory. The knowledge and purpose of a
parent and commentator can produce powerful insights that are
useful in criticizing, applying, and even reforming doctrine, but
lawsuits pose problems peculiar to their setting. If it seems odd
to a modernist to admit excited utterances, it seems at least
plausible to admit statements closely associated with the events
in litigation-what we used to call "res gestae" and Park now
calls "transactional" statements63-- and to let juries in on the
reactions of victims in the very accidents and crimes that lead
to suit.6
C. NEW SUPPORT FOR THE HEARSAY DoCTRINE
Looking at the structure of the federal hearsay provisions,
Park suggests two new reasons for current doctrine. The first
is a concern over misreporting out-of-court statements, which
can be inferred from exceptions that reach mostly or exclu-
sively written statements. Important provisions cover business
and public records, past recollection recorded, learned treatises
and former testimony,65 and we could add to the list the excep-
tion for prior inconsistent statements, which are almost invaria-
bly written or recorded and proved by use of transcripts. In
these provisions and numerous minor exceptions, Park sug-
gests, the doctrine prefers written statements, in part because
people giving testimonial accounts can too easily fabricate or
misreport the substance of oral statements. Even if we lack
proof that witnesses are better at describing events than state-
ments, we know at least that there is essentially no choice
when it comes to events (we must accept human accounts), but
often there is an alternative to remote statements.
63. See Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 74-75.
64. I know the excited utterance exception reaches the statements of by-
standers well out of harm's way, that the exciting event need not have sub-
stantive significance in the case, and that the exception reaches statements
that merely "relate" to the event without creating a word picture of it. More-
over, problems arise when a statement is offered to prove the very event that
justifies admitting it, and when declarants are unknown or respond to ques-
tions or speak long after the event. Some of these points raise questions, but
the principal utility of the exception is in exposing juries to the parties' reac-
tions to events leading to suit, and both experience and rationalist analysis can
defend the exception against at least some of these objections.
65. Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 71 & n.79, 74-76 (men-
tioning the host of exceptions that reach only or mostly written statements).
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The second reason is a lenience toward "transactional"
statements. Park describes these as statements that are "part
of the same general transaction or occurrence" which are
treated as "independently admissible nonverbal conduct." Ex-
amples include verbal acts, present sense impressions, excited
utterances, and dying declarations. "Transactional" statements
have two distinguishing features. They are not likely to come
as any surprise to the litigants, who will discover them in the
ordinary course of preparation, and they are less likely to be
fabricated, because they are generally uttered before the forces
that generate litigation have gained strength and come into
conflict.
D. PROCESS-BASED CONCERNS
Modern hearsay doctrine reflects process-based concerns
relating to pretrial events, trials, government power, and court
judgments.
1. Pretrial Investigation
Particularly in criminal cases, the hearsay doctrine reflects
concerns connected with the process of information gathering
by police and government investigators. Generally, police re-
ports and investigative findings by public agencies are inadmis-
sible against the accused.6 So are station house affidavits and
statements to police, typically given by people who know the
defendant and are implicated in the charged offenses. Even
though such statements often implicate both the declarant and
the defendant, they are usually not admissible as substantive
evidence because it is feared that the declarant was currying
favor-demonstrating that he can help convict the defendant
and offering to do so in exchange for favored treatment.6 7 If
the declarant testifies inconsistently at trial, the prior state-
66. Rule 803(8)(B) excludes reports of "matters observed by police of-
ficers and other law enforcement personnel" when offered against the accused.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B). An early decision interprets this language as a bar
against resort to all other hearsay exceptions. See United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 77 (2d Cir. 1977). However, other decisions permit resort to the excep-
tions for past recollection recorded under certain circumstances. See United
States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 27 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing use of the past recol-
lection recorded exception to prove absence of any record); United States v.
Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing use of the past recollec-
tion recorded exception when the declarant appeared and submitted to ques-
tioning), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
67. See generally LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 36, § 489.
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ments are admissible only to impeach; if he does not appear,
they are usually excluded altogether. Here lack of trustworthi-
ness cannot be the entire explanation because the Rules allow
use of police reports in civil cases, substantive use of some in-
consistent statements in criminal cases, and substantive use of
statements against penal interest.68
Barring substantive use of police reports and station house
affidavits against the accused conveys a deeper message. The
message is that the risks in this area are so great that nobody
can determine trustworthiness from a remote position, and
therefore nothing but live testimony suffices. Elsewhere the
trial judge is asked to assess trustworthiness with the guidance
of the criteria in the categorical exceptions, but not in the set-
ting of information gathering by the police. Instead, the officer
and the cooperating government witness must appear in court.
Cross-examination cannot make the officer or the witness relia-
ble, but it does give the defendant a chance to test and chal-
lenge their stories so the jury can evaluate them.69
Even when the cooperating witness testifies, arguably the
court should not admit as substantive evidence his prior accusa-
tory statements made to police or prosecutors. Here, however,
the Rules reach a compromise that is deeply ambivalent, even
conflicted. On the one hand, they forbid substantive use of
streetside or station house accusations, even if recorded or cast
as affidavits. On the other hand, they permit substantive use of
grand jury and other testimony. From a rationalist perspective,
this compromise is hard to explain. If the concern is that the
trial safeguards are not enough to help the factfinder choose
wisely between live testimony and prior statements, why make
an exception for what the accusing witness told a grand jury or
said in other proceedings? If the concern is that trial safe-
68. Grand jury testimony may be admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) if the
declarant testifies inconsistently at trial and is subject to cross-examination
about his earlier testimony. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). This seems to concede
the point that deferred cross-examination is capable of helping the jury sort
out what is true from what is false in the various utterances of the witness.
Still, this provision does not embrace station house affidavits and oral state-
ments to the police. This suggests that at least some tasks are beyond the ca-
pabilities of cross-examination. See LOuisELL & MUELLE, supra note 36,
§ 419.
69. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
Sixth Amendment, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 557 (1988) (criticizing modern decisions
for allowing evidence law to control confrontation rights, and arguing that the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is not to guarantee the reliability of evi-
dence but to guarantee the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses).
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guards cannot reliably detect concocted or fabricated state-
ments, isn't Professor Michael Graham right in saying that the
Rule should also make exception for affidavits and for state-
ments the accusing witness admits making?70
2. Trials
Again especially in criminal cases, the hearsay doctrine re-
flects concerns over the capacity of courts in an adversary sys-
tem to appraise remote statements. Because all agree that live
testimony is preferable to remote statements, the preference is
self-executing to some extent. Freely admitting hearsay, how-
ever, would create a perverse incentive for lawyers with strong
statements by unattractive declarants to offer them through
more appealing proxy witnesses. Of course the conventional ac-
count of hearsay stresses trial-focused, process-based con-
cerns,71 and indeed these concerns run even further than the
conventional account suggests.
To begin with, practitioners strongly believe that juries,
and to some extent judges, decide cases largely on what they
see happening in the courtroom. Practitioners see, in other
words, a danger that factfinders may misappraise hearsay be-
cause they attribute to remote statements the credibility of the
witness who reports them.72 Perhaps, as some practitioners be-
lieve, this response is less a matter of confusion than a realistic
reaction to the fact that the most visible evidence of the credi-
70. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION 257-58 (1985) (pro-
posing amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to embrace, in addition to testimony,
any statement "written or signed" or "accurately recorded" or acknowledged
by the witness as his own, providing that he has "personal knowledge" of the
events reported in the statement). Some might argue, however, that grand
jury testimony is the statement of a witness in a sense that an affidavit is not,
because the witness (even if coached) actually says the words in his grand jury
testimony, while a station house affidavit may well be the words of a police
officer to which the witness simply appends his signature.
71. The declarant is needed in court so his perception, memory, honesty,
and use of language can be tested. The trier of fact can learn more about un-
derlying events by hearing a witness who saw them than by hearing a report-
ing witness tell about what he heard of the events. Even if a reporting witness
accurately recalls what he heard and the declarant accurately describes what
he saw, much more can be learned by questioning the declarant directly than
by questioning another person about what the declarant said. Even absent
problems with memory and perception, problems with narration remain.
72. Cf. Edward E. Jones, The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions, 34
AM. PSYCHOL. 107, 111 (1979) (describing the tendency of an observer errone-
ously to attribute to the subject attitudes "in line with the thrust" of whatever
the subject reports).
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bility of the remote declarant is the reaction of the in-court
witness.
In criminal prosecutions, moreover, the problem of apprais-
ing remote statements has further dimensions. As Park sug-
gests, jurors may "misvalue" police reports even if they are
generally trustworthy because conflicting claims of guilt and in-
nocence force a "naked choice" of accepting or rejecting them.73
This issue "implicates the jury's entire view of the reliability of
law enforcement personnel, and its faith in the criminal justice
system."74 Similarly, admitting third-party station house affida-
vits and statements to police would pose intolerable risks if an
accusing witness does not testify, because "an experienced pro-
fessional" police officer would become the proxy "for one who
might be more vulnerable to impeachment" and introduce risks
of "misreport or fabrication," which would put an extraordi-
nary burden on the trier of fact to sort things out.75 In effect,
the Federal Rules convey the message that these burdens are
simply too heavy for the cross-examiner to carry.
Finally, as practitioners argue, it is hard to uncover in-
court fabrication and misreporting of remote statements.7 6 The
connection of an eyewitness to the realities of the events in liti-
gation is fuller than the connection of an "earwitness" to state-
ments describing such events, and the testing process provided
by trials works better when the person being tested has first-
hand knowledge of salient facts.
In short, even if the concerns usually associated with un-
tested hearsay could be overlooked, there would remain consid-
erable skepticism that the safeguards provided by the trial
process itself could adequately help factfinders distinguish be-
tween the credibility of reporting witnesses and that of remote
declarants, or adequately test in-court reporting of out-of-court
statements.
73. Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 95-96.
74. Id. at 96.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 57-58, 61. When a statement is offered under an exception to the
hearsay doctrine, however, the objection that the testifying witness cannot be
trusted is typically rejected. See United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 832-34
(7th Cir.) (rejecting government claim that testimony by one codefendant
describing the out-of-court statement of another, offered under the state-of-
mind exception, should have been excluded because the testifying witness was
untrustworthy), cert denied, 488 U.S. 969 (1988).
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3. Government Power
In criminal cases, the hearsay doctrine reflects concerns
over the exercise of government power. In this setting the
court is a government institution and the prosecutor a govern-
ment agent. The doctrine prevents prosecutions and convic-
tions based on remote statements gathered by police, perhaps in
secret, and untested in open court. In requiring live testimony,
usually by a witness who submits to cross-examination in pub-
lic, the doctrine operates as a critical restraint. Even in civil
cases the doctrine is a significant and important restraint, limit-
ing the institutional authority of courts and forcing the govern-
ment to proceed with care in its pursuit of regulatory
enforcement, again on the basis of live cross-examinable
testimony.
Conventional hearsay doctrine can be understood as an in-
cursion on the independence of factfinders (judges or lay ju-
rors) because it displaces with legal rules the common-sense
understanding they would otherwise bring to the assessment of
remote statements. 77 The hearsay doctrine does not implement
substantive policies like those underlying privileges, presump-
tions, and burdens of proof, nor does it protect parties against
popular passion or prejudice. But the hearsay doctrine does
serve legitimate societal interests of the sort described in this
Article. It protects parties from the mistaken appraisal of re-
mote statements affected by obvious but essentially un-
measurable risks (process-based concerns) and helps insure
that factfinders ordinarily have the benefits provided by live
testimony and the safeguards of the trial process.
4. Purpose of Judgments
Finally, the hearsay doctrine reflects process-based con-
cerns over public respect for judgments. As Professor Nesson
argues, judgments project values embedded in social norms,
demonstrate that transgressing those norms carries conse-
quences and shows that conforming to them is both good and
expedient.7 What we aspire to project by means of court judg-
77. Swift, Foundation Fact Approach, supra note 7, at 1367-69 (arguing
that admitting hearsay with the necessary foundation facts "would enlarge the
independence" of factfinders, who ought to be "nonaccountable" and freed
from "precedential bureaucratic generalizations" that give "undue weight to
government or other established interests and policies that go beyond the out-
come in a particular case").
78. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
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ments is not that getting caught is painful, or that winning is
profitable and losing costly, but that conforming to social norms
is preferable to violating them and that persons injured when
such norms are transgressed may have redress-in short, that
we believe in the norms enough to give them teeth.
To achieve this larger purpose, rules of procedure and evi-
dence should provide reason for confidence that courts reach
correct outcomes by fair means. Probably the hearsay doctrine
serves this function. Although lay people do not understand
the underlying complexities of even the conventional account,
surely the doctrine reflects a common preference to hear from
and speak to observers directly, as happens at trial where live
witnesses testify under questioning by lawyers. In this respect
the doctrine reflects a kind of common sense to which lay peo-
ple can relate.79
More elaborate arguments on the interplay between the
hearsay doctrine and the larger purpose of judgments are less
persuasive. It has been suggested that excluding hearsay pro-
tects judgments against later attack by remote declarants who
recant.8 0 One commentator suggests that the insistence on de-
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1359-60 (1985); see also
Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis" A Reassessment of Current
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 782 (1987) (stating that dis-
pute resolution through tort law is vital "because it reinforces the normative
order upon which society depends").
79. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016-18 (1988) (quoting William Shake-
speare and Dwight Eisenhower on the value of "face to face" confrontation be-
tween accuser and accused); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (finding
that confrontation and cross-examination contribute to "the perception as well
as the reality of fairness"); see also Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note
7, at 102-03 (arguing that in criminal cases the hearsay doctrine contributes to
"independence of the decisionmaker" by preventing outside pressure that
would result if each party had "the full facts before trial" and by letting the
jury determine the credibility of people it sees, not the general credibility of
government agents and other absent people).
80. See Nesson, supra note 78, at 1373 (arguing that freely admitting hear-
say would be dangerous because declarants might recant, which would under-
cut the long-term acceptability of verdicts; also that excluding hearsay poses
less risk because live witnesses commit themselves to their testimony under
oath, subject to penalty of perjury). Park counters that excluding hearsay is
riskier from the standpoint of protecting verdicts, because declarants may
come forward and reiterate what they said earlier, which undermines a verdict
if their statements were not considered. See Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule
and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1057, 1064 (1986). Both these arguments suggest that we spend too much
time in the ivory tower. How likely is it that observers will take the trouble to
come forward and attack a verdict, either by recanting remote statements that
were admitted or by reiterating statements that were excluded? Do lawyers
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meanor evidence (largely a function of the hearsay doctrine)
helps assure that going to trial poses a risk of uncertain out-
come, which may be beneficial because some cases must be
tried in order to insure development of the law.8 ' The first of
these arguments is speculative at best; the supposed risk of a
remote declarant recanting appears minimal. The second sug-
gestion amounts to an attempt to find some benefit, rather than
an account of purpose, in current practice. The suggestion is
problematic because it seems unlikely that a complete absence
of evidence rules or specific revisions to current rules would
measurably reduce the uncertainty of trying cases. Both argu-
ments suffer from being almost too clever, too far beyond the
apparent meaning and concerns of the hearsay doctrine.
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING RULES
Among the standard defenses of the hearsay doctrine is the
argument that practitioners need rules to try cases. The argu-
ment has several dimensions.
First, lawyers have to prepare for trial and know what they
are up against. Abolishing the hearsay doctrine would require
trial lawyers to confront more uncertainty; it would force or
encourage more efforts to investigate cases, thus raising costs; it
would skew settlements in ways that seem undesirable insofar
as we hope settlements project some approximation of legal
norms. This objection loses some of its cogency, however, when
we recognize that both the civil and criminal rules permit each
side to keep many out-of-court statements under wraps, so
neither side is sure to know what hearsay will be offered.8 2 As
Park and others suggest, if notice is all that blocks hearsay evi-
miss many important witnesses, and therefore fail to call them or offer their
statements? Notorious cases generate enormous public interest, but who sup-
poses that many citizens worry about which hearsay was admitted and which
excluded, or would pay attention if observers came forward and attacked
outcomes?
81. Saks, supra note 44, at 273 (developing the concept of the "optimal
gray" cases that must be tried if courts are "to announce, refine, revise, and
reverse the law").
82. In civil cases, lawyers can invoke work product protection for the
statements they gather, and the adversary can obtain them only by showing
special need. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). In criminal cases, the so-called
Jencks Act blocks defense discovery of statements obtained by the prosecutor
that implicate the accused, and a notion of reciprocity (coupled with fears of
infringing the privilege against self-incrimination) blocks government discov-
ery of statements obtained by the defense. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2),
(b)(2).
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dence, we could address the problem with a notice system.8 3
Second, it is not clear that judges will perform better with-
out rules to apply. Practitioners strongly believe they need pro-
tection against broad judicial discretion. They worry that if
judges are freed completely from the constraint of rules by the
generality of a "standard," subject only to the immediate pres-
sures of lawyers and trials, the judges are very likely to err by
favoring one or another lawyer or cause without principled ba-
sis, not so much because they are venal but because they are
human. One post-modern critic of hearsay reports, on the basis
of admittedly fragmentary and preliminary data, that the pat-
tern of observed rulings does not support the hypothesis that
political biases of judges explain hearsay rulings.84 Trial judges
may need rules of some sort to deal wisely with hearsay. It is
one thing for Judge Weinstein, who is both a scholar and an ex-
traordinary jurist, to claim judges work better without rules,8s
and quite another to suppose most judges can do so. 6 Rules
also invite a second look by appellate courts, which probably
contributes to the development of sound doctrine and corrects
some mistakes.
Finally, even discretionary rules will produce doctrinal
complexity unless they grant judges essentially complete dis-
cretion. Writing thirty years ago from his post in the academy,
Weinstein coupled his proposal for a broad-gauged hearsay ex-
ception with the suggestion that appellate courts exercise more
control over verdicts resting on hearsay, and freely weigh hear-
say in deciding whether the evidence suffices to sustain a judg-
ment.8 7 It is almost inconceivable that this practice would fail
to generate new doctrines suggesting which hearsay is admissi-
ble, and when and under what circumstances.
83. See, e.g., Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 100-01, 112-
13, 119.
84. See Swift, supra note 48, at 483-84.
85. See Weinstein, Probative Force, supra note 21, at 353.
86. One commentator discussed Judge Weinstein's conduct of the Agent
Orange litigation: "It is nice to have charismatic judges, but this is hardly a
trend to be embraced; as Max Weber observed long ago, in a complex society it
is necessary to shift authority from a charismatic to an institutionalized leader-
ship." Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267, 1293
(1987) (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 329-60 (M. Rheinstein ed., 1954) while reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL MAss ToxIc DISASTERs IN THE COuRTs (1986)).
87. See Weinstein, Probative Force, supra note 21, at 341-42 (stating that
the appellate court may be "in as good a position as the trier" to evaluate
hearsay).
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F. WHAT TO MAKE OF THE NEW AccouNT?
An appeal to complexity in understanding modem hearsay
raises two questions. In what sense does established doctrine
reflect newly-discovered concerns? How should we understand
process-based concerns as part of a hearsay doctrine when these
arguably belong to constitutional jurisprudence?
The first question is important because the post-modem ac-
count suggests not so much basic reform as new understanding
of existing doctrine. That suggests, in turn, that this new un-
derstanding should affect the application and construction of
current doctrine.
The hearsay doctrine comes out of the mists of common
law tradition,"8 but the Federal Rules produced a rich legisla-
tive history and a new reference point.8 9 Arguably the "true"
reasons for modem doctrine are set out in the Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, which adopts the conventional modem account. 9°
A committed historicist l or positivist would find support in the
legislative history of the Rules for at least the most important
points in the post-modem account.9 2 To the extent an objection
remains, there are at least two good answers. One is a subtle
point Park makes that might satisfy even a historicist, which is
that influences shaping the evolution of doctrine are not always
"acknowledged" or even "consciously considered," and judges
and lawyers limit or expand hearsay exceptions for reasons
88. Because the conventional modern account sought to rationalize com-
mon law rather than describe "original intent," arguably it is no more secure
than post-modern accounts, even if the Federal Rules had never appeared.
89. Published materials include three drafts of the Rules by the Advisory
Committee, records of hearings in the House and Senate (consisting of three
volumes of testimony and written statements by lawyers, judges, academics,
and interest groups), drafts of proposed legislation and revisions, three com-
mittee reports, and even amendment and debate on the floor of the House and
Senate. There are also studies published and circulated locally, not widely
available, and unpublished material, such as letters and internal drafts and
reports.
90. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's introductory note (cit-
ing the preference for testimony given under oath in the presence of the trier
of fact and subject to cross-examination, and listing perception, memory, nar-
ration, and sincerity as factors bearing on the evaluation of testimony).
91. The term "historicist" is borrowed from RONALD M. DwORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 360 (1986).
92. The much argued debate between "originalists" or "interpretivists" or
"historicists" on the one hand, and what my colleague Steven Smith calls
"present-oriented interpretivists" on the other hand, fills innumerable articles
and books. For a useful, short summary and critique of the debate, see Steven
D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REv. 104 (1989).
[Vol. 76:367
POST-MODERW REFORM
"not recognized or expressed." 93 Another is that the Rules did
not displace all prior tradition, and indeed they exhort courts to
take into account broader concerns.9 4
Process-based concerns do belong in hearsay doctrine.
They appear in congressional testimony and reports, which
should prove the point.9 5 Ironically, contemporary confronta-
tion decisions emphasize traditional hearsay concerns, espe-
cially trustworthiness, and virtually immunize from exclusion
statements admitted under firmly rooted exceptions.96 These
decisions focus on courtroom process-based concerns9 7 but ig-
nore pretrial process-based concerns, while critics urge exactly
the opposite approach.98
93. Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 70-71 n.78, 81 (judges
and lawyers might agree, for instance, to an exception "partly" because it does
not pose much risk of "surprise" at trial).
94. Rule 102 exhorts courts to construe the rules fairly in order to find
truth, obtain just results, and promote "growth and development" of evidence
law. FED. R. EVID. 102. See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading
the Rules of Evidence, 57 NFB. L. REv. 908, 915 (1978) (arguing that, although
in principle "no common law of evidence" survived enactment of the Rules, in
reality "the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the
somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated
powers").
95. See supra note 54; see also H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1973) (considering but rejecting the concerns over defense intimidation of wit-
nesses as a justification for admitting all prior inconsistent statements).
96. See Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3147-48, 3150-51 (1990) (catchall
exception is not firmly rooted; corroborating evidence does not guarantee
trustworthiness for confrontation purposes); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
387, 392-400 (1986) (coconspirator exception does not require declarant unavail-
ability); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-66 (1980) (availability of the declarant
and the trustworthiness of the statement are the concerns of the Confronta-
tion Clause, and a statement falling within a firmly rooted exception is trust-
worthy). See generally Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay:
Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 665 (1986) (identifying hearsay exceptions that should or should not be
subject to a constitutional requirement of unavailability).
97. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166-67, 3170 (1990) (approving
use of live one-way video for child victim testimony); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1020-22 (1988) (disapproving use of screen preventing child witness from
seeing defendant).
98. See Jonakait, supra note 69, at 579-81 (arguing that using confronta-
tion jurisprudence to police reliability of hearsay makes the Confrontation
Clause "meaningless as a fundamental right"; its purpose is to protect adver-
sarial testing of evidence by cross-examination); Roger W. Kirst, The Proce-
dural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REv. 485, 498 (1987)
(arguing that restoring the procedural dimension to confrontation jurispru-
dence will increase clarity of the doctrine and provide a "workable test" for
judges, because it should usually be clear whether the hearsay was "created in
the process of prosecution"); see also Margaret A. Berger, Vie Deconstitution-
alization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Re-
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Given the overlap between hearsay and confrontation, pre-
trial process-based concerns are properly the focus of both.99
Indeed, however strong the arguments for a new direction in
confrontation jurisprudence, 00 hearsay doctrine should reflect
such issues as well, for three reasons.
First, the current direction of the Court, both in its con-
frontation jurisprudence and its obvious interest in aiding law
enforcement, suggests that it will not provide leadership on this
front, and will not likely undertake a Warren-style project gen-
erating broad and detailed doctrines restraining police and
prosecutors. The ongoing drug crisis and the legislative unwill-
ingness to tackle the problem through legalization and civil reg-
ulation combine to suggest that the Court is unlikely to change
direction soon.
Second, a court attracted to developing a confrontation ju-
risprudence reflecting pretrial process-based concerns might
hesitate because it would face difficult and conflicting pressures
over breadth. The four major Warren Court doctrines10 ' relat-
straint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 605, 613 (1992) (confrontation
jurisprudence focusing on trustworthiness provides "illusory protection," and
the focus should be on the police role in generating statements).
99. The origins of the Confrontation Clause are obscure, but the clearly
unjust use of Lord Cobham's confession against Sir Walter Raleigh in the
Tower had something to do with it. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972). Commentators espouse different views about the
Confrontation Clause. Wigmore thought it related only to trial testimony. See
5 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 1397. Prior to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),
and other contemporary decisions, Peter Westen argued that the Confronta-
tion Clause required the government to produce available witnesses. See Peter
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evi-
dence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 574-79 (1978). Kenneth Gra-
ham argued that the focus of confrontation analysis should be sufficiency
rather than admissibility, that it matters how hearsay is used, and whether it
is crucial or merely corroborative. See Graham, supra, at 128-31. Consistent
with Westen's interpretation, Graham Lilly suggests that the Clause was a re-
action against the inquisitorial procedure followed by English vice-admiralty
courts trying colonists for violating trade restrictions. See Graham C. Lilly,
Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
207, 211 (1984).
100. Embracing pretrial process-based concerns in confrontation jurispru-
dence enables the Court to carry them to state criminal cases. Commentators
disappointed in the Court's treatment of ordinary hearsay issues in confronta-
tion cases reviewing application of the coconspirator exception, see Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987) (diluting the independent evidence
requirement); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-400 (1986) (refusing to
require unavailability of the declarant), hope for more intervention on behalf
of defendants if the Court shifts its focus to pretrial process-based concerns.
101. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (the exclusionary doctrine
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ing to evidence and developed to protect defendants-Mapp,
Miranda, Massiah, and Wade-Stovall-are truly prophylactic in
the sense that they seek to reform police investigative conduct
by reducing incentives for police misbehavior. But misbehavior
is not the problem with reports that police prepare or the state-
ments they gather that prosecutors might like to offer in evi-
dence. A court that moved in the recommended direction
would offer too little protection to the accused if it focused only
on cases where law enforcement officers have clearly over-
reached. Likewise, the Court could not hope to achieve much
in the way of reforming police behavior if it focused on protect-
ing the accused against every statement so affected by the un-
derlying process that determining its reliability is impossible.
Wade-Stovall is the Warren-era doctrine that most clearly
poses a similar dilemma, because police lineups and other iden-
tification procedures do not themselves violate defense rights.
Notably the Wade-Stovall doctrine is the one that seems most
in eclipse today.'0 2
Finally, aggressively constitutionalizing pretrial process-
based concerns as the Court set out to do in Mapp and Miranda
would involve some cost. It would likely chill debate and dis-
cussion of underlying concerns at other levels, and dissuade lo-
cal courts and rulemakers from developing separate doctrines
or addressing issues arising during periods between Court pro-
nouncements. We should invite attention to these concerns as a
covering illegally seized evidence); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73
(1966) (warnings after arrest); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07
(1964) (interrogation after the right of counsel attaches); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-39 (1967) (the right to counsel during post-indictment
lineups); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298-99, 301-02 (1967) (the due process
right to exclude in-court testimony based on suggestive pretrial identification).
102. Where the Wade-Stovall doctrine applies, it excludes third-party state-
ments or testimony offered against the accused, while the other three doc-
trines focus on statements or objects taken from him personally. Wade still
bars use of a post-indictment out-of-court identification where the defendant's
right to counsel was denied, but it does not block in-court testimony by the
same identifier if the in-court identification has an independent origin: Wade,
388 U.S. at 242. Wade does not reach pre-indictment lineups, see Kirby v. Illi-
nois, 406 U.S. 682, 687-91 (1972), or identifications based on photographic dis-
plays, see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313-21 (1973). Moreover, the due
process restriction suggested in Stovall for identifications based on misleading
lineups amounts to very little. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14
(1977) (finding that in-court identification taken from suggestive pre-indict-
ment procedures need not be excluded if, under all the circumstances, it seems
reliable); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-201 (1972) (stating that determining
whether to exclude pre-indictment identification depends on whether sugges-
tive influence would require exclusion of live courtroom identification).
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matter of hearsay doctrine, in the hope that occasional Court
forays into the area will not remove it completely from the am-
bit of evidence law. We should look to the Court for occasional
and general guidance, rather than multipart tests pouring new
meaning into the Confrontation Clause.103
III. POST-MODERN REFORM PROPOSALS
A. THE FOUNDATION FACT APPROACH
One of the most striking and original proposals on hearsay
reform comes from Professor Swift, who suggests that courts
should admit hearsay if proponents present "foundation facts"
enabling a jury to evaluate it intelligently.104 Her approach is
revolutionary because she challenges the process of determin-
ing reliability by class exceptions, and thus strikes at the heart
of conventional doctrine. In another sense her approach is re-
strained, because she would generally not admit hearsay with-
out precautions analogous to those that surround the
presentation of live courtroom testimony. Thus she agrees that
hearsay merits special concern and she acknowledges that her
approach might not be adopted, suggesting as a fallback that it
could be joined with conventional doctrine to improve its
performance. 10 5
Swift accepts "operational accuracy" as a primary value for
evidence rules, and recognizes that factfinders (judges and ju-
ries) must assess credibility in order to perform well. The crux
of her argument is that conventional doctrine does not accu-
rately sift out unreliable evidence and admit reliable evidence,
and does not ensure enough information to help the factfinder
wisely appraise the evidence it admits. The doctrine errs, she
says, both in what it excludes and in what it admits. 10 6 It errs
103. See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUIONAL CULTURES: THE
MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JuDICIAL REVIEW ch. 6 (1989) (arguing that
complex doctrinal development isolates the Court from the public and as-
saults, more than shapes, culture); Robert F. Nagel, Forgetting the Constitu-
tion, 6 CONST. CoMMENTARY 289, 298 (1989) (arguing that constitutionalizing a
right of privacy impoverishes experience, understanding, and debate of impor-
tant ideas).
104. See Swift, Foundation Fact Azproach, supra note 7, at 1355-57.
105. Id- at 1390. Swift develops her proposal in detail, and by summarizing
it I run the risk of distorting it. The description that follows is an attempt to
appraise her proposal, not work it out completely or fault it on small points,
and is undertaken despite the risk of distortion and the problem of being
incomplete.
106. Id- at 1361-63. Swift makes additional claims that conventional doc-
trine deprives factfinders of independence and that the necessity concept un-
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in its exclusionary effect because the categorical exceptions em-
body "a far narrower range of knowledge about reliability"'10 7
than factfinders could bring to bear, given appropriate informa-
tion. It errs in what it admits because those exceptions require
less foundation-less information on candor, narrative mean-
ing, perception, and memory-than factfinders need to appraise
hearsay. Hillmon'0 8 provides a useful example to illustrate
Swift's first point. There, letters from Walters to his fiance and
sister were admitted to show that he intended to go west with
Hillmon, and probably did. 0 9 Even today we would choke at
using the letters to show the two talked it over. Can anyoneimagine, in the affairs of life, believing what a man writes his
sister and fiance about his plans for the future, but doubting
what he says about meeting and talking to the fellow with
whom he made his plans?
Swift suggests an example that makes her second point.
Two people wait for a bus, and one tells the other the bus ran a
stop sign.n Conventional exceptions would admit the state-
ment if the speaker was excited or spoke as it happened. How-
ever, the reason one might credit such a statement has less to
do with excitement or contemporaneity than with the fact that
the observer was likely watching the bus attentively, her obser-
fairly accommodates hearsay proponents at the expense of their adversaries.
However, these ideas seem less important to her proposal, and I am also less
persuaded by them. I believe that factfinders should be independent enough
to do their best and should function independently of pressure from the par-
ties-including the state in criminal cases. However, independence is a virtue
only insofar as it serves the interest of accurate factfinding or permits juries to
refuse to convict a defendant no matter what the evidence shows. I do not
think conventional doctrine threatens jury independence in the latter sense,
and I think accurate factfinding rather than jury independence should be the
focus of hearsay reform.
Swift's concerns about the necessity concept are less disturbing if one un-
derstands Wigmorean "necessity" as more vague and modulated than Swift's
discussion suggests. The "balance" struck between the rule and the exceptions
does not seem out of whack as between proponents and opponents. Swift is
not talking about pretrial access or surprise, nor claimants and defendants or
prosecutors and accused people, where a concern over fairness makes sense.
More persuasive (to my mind) is Swift's claim that conventional "balance" errs
in what it admits and excludes. For her arguments in her words, see id. at
1367-75.
107. Id. at 1383.
108. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). See generally
Douglas D. McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tales: Thirty Times Three Years of the
Judicial Process After Hillmon, 30 VLL. L. REV. 1, 18-27 (1985) (describing the
Hillmon case).
109. Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 299-300.
110. Swift, Foundation Fact Approach, supra note 7, at 1358-59.
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vation is simple and the event familiar, and she has no apparent
reason to lie or err.
Here is the essence of Swift's proposal: A party may intro-
duce hearsay through a "process foundation witness" who de-
scribes the circumstances in which the declarant perceived,
remembered, and spoke, which provides the factfinder with in-
formation relating to candor, ambiguity, perception, and mem-
ory. A process foundation witness is likely to be someone at
the scene who saw whatever the declarant saw, but these ele-
ments are not critical. In the example of the bus running a
stop sign, Swift says the listener can provide the necessary
foundation even if she did not see the event. Similarly, if some-
one makes a record in the routine of business and a witness
knows the routine and describes the circumstances that typi-
cally surround gathering and reporting, she too can act as a pro-
cess foundation witness even though she was not present when
the particular record was made.
Where the proponent cannot produce a process foundation
witness but the statement indicates that the declarant saw and
understood the matters reported, Swift would still allow him to
offer the hearsay if he produces an "identification foundation
witness" who provides information bearing on the declarant's
candor and meaning."' If the adverse party "had access to the
declarant prior to trial," the proponent would not need to call a
foundation witness." 2 This part of the proposal paves the way
for statements usually admitted today under the exceptions for
admissions or former testimony.
The Swift proposal would almost certainly lead to some
changes in outcome. Most (perhaps all) out-of-court statements
by testifying witnesses would be admissible, but fewer public
investigative records, coconspirator statements, and declara-
tions against penal interest, where the terms of existing excep-
tions seem furthest from producing the foundation facts Swift
would require. Precisely because the key is the presence of
foundation facts, and not categories or reliability, it is hard to
say how many results would change. In many cases what
would change is the nature of the preliminary showing the pro-
ponent would make. Some mechanical details would probably
111. Id at 1383 (suggesting an "adjusted foundation" rule admitting hear-
say if a process foundation witness cannot be had, but the statement sets out
"specific circumstances" relating to perception, memory, and speaking, and the
proponent "also produces an identification foundation witness").
112. I&
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raise justifiable concerns among practitioners.1 13 Also the im-
ponderable that always haunts talk of liberalizing hearsay
haunts the Swift proposal too-the fear that many hitherto-
unimagined remote statements of the most casual sort will
make their way into evidence as proof of major points.114
One strength of the Swift proposal is that it calls for partic-
ularized treatment of remote statements. They would not be
squeezed into exceptions that artificially restrict their use. If
adequate foundation testimony had been presented in the
Hilimon case,-15 for example, the letters from Walters could be
113. For example, the remote declarant might testify to the foundation
facts, then leave the stand to let others who heard the statement give its sub-
stance to the factfinder. This strategy puts the adverse party to an unattrac-
tive choice-try to attack the statement by cross-examining people who know
nothing about the events or recall the declarant and risk an unsuccessful
cross-examination that strengthens the statement. But this objection could be
met by requiring the declarant, if he serves as a process foundation witness, to
testify to the substance of his own statement before other evidence of it is of-
fered, so the cross-examiner could question the remote declarant without
seeming to initiate an attack that may not succeed.
114. Of course, witnesses to events that become central or relevant in liti-
gation might note them in a conversation, phone call, diary, or letter. Remote
statements of this sort may be largely invisible to readers of cases because they
fall far outside standard exceptions and are seldom offered. Even practitioners
may pay them little heed because they are part of an array of background in-
formation that shapes an investigation, because they duplicate information
provided by the client, and because they are never considered as potential "ev-
idence" for trial. The Swift reform, along with most proposed reforms, might
persuade lawyers to seek out more such statements, and use those that are
best immunized from counterattack at trial. Does experience applying the
catchall exceptions support or refute claims that lawyers are just waiting to
offer much unimagined hearsay? I don't know. For an example of hearsay
sure to trouble lawyers, see Clark v. City of L.A., 650 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982) (finding trial court erred in admitting
plaintiff's diary describing encounters with police in suit by street vendors al-
leging discriminatory enforcement of permit laws).
115. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). In 1880, Sallie
Hillmon sued Mutual Life Insurance Company on a policy insuring the life of
her husband, John W. Hillmon. The well-known drama of this case has been
chronicled frequently, and it is a standard in evidence courses. See Brooks W.
MacCracken, The Case of the Anonymous Corpse, AM. HERITAGE, June 1968, at
51; John MacArthur Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-Three Years After, 38
HARv. L. REv. 709, 709-10 (1925). The letters crucial to the case were written
by Adolph Walters to his sister Elizabeth and his fiance Alvina Kasten in early
March, 1879, about two weeks before Walters died. The letter to Elizabeth had
been lost, and she testified to its contents from memory. The letter to Alvina
was produced. There, Hillmon said:
I will stay here [in Wichita] until the fore part of next week, and then
will leave here to see a part of the country that I never expected to
see when I left home, as I am going with a man by the name of
Hillmon, who intends to start a sheep ranch, and, as he promised me
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admitted to prove not merely what Walters planned to do, and
later did, but also that he met with Hillmon and the two made
plans together. On the Hillmon facts, there was probably no
process foundation witness who could give live testimony that
Walters saw and heard Hillmon or recalled the meeting when
he wrote his letters. Walters himself would qualify, but he was
dead; Hillmon was missing (perhaps dead) and probably nobody
else could be produced. Perhaps the insurance carrier could of-
fer the letters on the basis of identification testimony by, for in-
stance, the sister and fiance, who could describe Walters,
answer questions about his experiences in life, discuss how he
talked and whether and how far they trusted his word, thus
giving the factfinder information useful in deciding whether to
believe the letters.116
Another strong quality in the Swift approach is that it
would require the proponent to offer more evidence helpful in
assessing the declarant's credibility than some standard excep-
tions now require, usually in the form of testimony by a know-
ledgeable foundation witness who can be cross-examined.-' 7
Today's lawyer who offers an excited utterance or present
sense impression leads the testifying witness through the ele-
ments of the exceptions, and then his job is done. Swift's law-
yer leads the witness through points that bear more
particularly on the persuasive force of the statement, and he
submits to cross-examination on these points.
more wages than I could make at anything else I concluded to take it,
for a while at least, until I strike something better. There is so many
folks in this country that have got the Leadville fever, and if I could
not of got the situation that I have now I would have went there my-
self; but as it is at present I get to see the best portion of Kansas, In-
dian Territory, Colorado, and Mexico.
Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 288-89.
116. Swift's examples of "identification foundation witnesses" are people
who observed the declarant as she spoke. See Swift, Foundation Fact Ap-
proach, supra note 7, at 1379-80. Swift would apparently allow resort to such
foundation witnesses only if the statement itself describes the manner in
which the speaker came to know of what he describes. Neither of these condi-
tions could be satisfied on the facts of Hillmon. Presumably nobody watched
Walters set his thoughts to paper, and the surviving letter to his fiance Alvina
surely implies, in the strong sense of intentionally suggesting, that he met
Hillmon personally and talked to him. However, the letter does not actually
refer to such a meeting. One might hope that the Swift approach would de-
velop some flexibility in such cases. It is hard to imagine learning more from a
witness who watched Walters write than from one who knows him well but
didn't see him write. The inference that Walters met Hillmon seems safe,
even though the letters do not actually describe the meeting.
117. See id. at 1357-58.
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A third strong quality in the Swift approach is that it
would simplify administration while avoiding standard pitfalls.
It would greatly reduce the long list of hearsay provisions, and
would allow many statements to be admitted without the limits
present doctrine imposes on permissible uses at trial. More-
over, the approach does not entail unreviewable discretion,
with resultant problems of reactive, unreasoned, or unwise rul-
ings. Under the Swift proposal, reviewing courts would not de-
cide from afar whether the hearsay was reliable, but whether
the factfinder received what it needs to decide the point. Thus,
the proposal does not portend a return to a growing body of
common law rules on reliability.
The difficulties in this approach seem to be three. First,
understanding and appraising a person from what someone says
about her is very different from seeing and hearing her. Evi-
dence of credibility is mostly circumstantial, but each piece is
not of equal value. The Swift approach almost equates infor-
mation bearing on credibility with the live performance, but a
performance conveys more about important qualities, including
whether one is serious or flippant, engaged or unconcerned, fo-
cused or scattered, fairminded or partisan, and so forth.118
Even the best informed "process foundation witness"-one who
knows the speaker well and was with her when she saw and
spoke-may not know other important facts, such as that she
once before saw a bus run a stop sign and kill or hurt someone.
A foundation witness might miss important clues in the
speaker's demeanor"i 9 that could be uncovered in live question-
ing, and might not even be allowed to convey the one conclu-
sion a live performance asks factfinders to draw: Is the person
to be believed or not? 2 0
118. The hearsay doctrine is self-executing to the extent that a party has a
good witness and prefers to offer her views directly rather than through a
proxy testifying to her remote statement. The absence of hearsay doctrine
would create a perverse incentive, where a party has a percipient but unap-
pealing witness, to call a more attractive proxy. Of course the adversary could
call the percipient witness, but doing so would be risky and taking this course
would likely prolong trials.
119. In common experience, comments made off the cuff or in jest are
taken seriously, and comments intended seriously are mistaken as facetious.
Although factfinders can make similar mistakes, the trial process invites test-
ing and probing that people do not pursue in their daily lives, particularly
where the matters under discussion do not directly affect them. Moreover,
when juries find the facts, six people (or nine or twelve) evaluate these points.
120. Usually the party who calls a witness may not also offer an opinion by
a second witness vouching for the truthfulness of the first, unless the adver-
sary launches an attack on the first witness's truthfulness. Usually one wit-
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A partial response is that the Swift approach would often
produce a live performance after all. In the common situation
where the proponent cannot find someone who was with the
declarant when she saw and when she spoke, only the declar-
ant can give all the foundation facts and the proponent must
call her if he can. Thus the worst possibility-a party present-
ing his case through a proxy witness reporting her own out-of-
court utterances-would seldom come to be. In short, the Swift
approach would not issue a general invitation to present sec-
ond-best evidence.
Second, this approach undervalues process-based concerns.
As noted above, station house affidavits and police reports are
generally inadmissible against the accused, and reliability is not
the only reason. But the Swift approach would admit station
house affidavits and even police investigative reports under
some circumstances. 121 Of course a foundation fact approach
could accommodate the process-based objection by incorporat-
ing specific rules barring certain kinds of remote statements.
Third, the Swift proposal presents two difficult options.
One is to discard complicated theory, learning, and doctrine and
replace them with something simpler but very different.
Maybe it will happen, but I don't think so. The other option is
to incorporate the best of the Swift proposal into current doc-
trine, which poses some difficulty because the two work at dif-
ferent purposes (one seeks to provide evaluative information,
the other to measure trustworthiness) and grafting foundation
fact requirements to existing exceptions is a half-a-loaf mea-
sure.122 But this difficulty may not be insuperable. It would
ness cannot say whether he thinks another testified truthfully. A powerful
argument can be made that these rules should be discarded when the propo-
nent offers hearsay through a process or identification foundation witness. If
the factfinder does not have a live performance on which to base its decision
on veracity, perhaps it should have the next-best thing, the listener's opinion
on that point. Swift is content to leave to "existing evidence rules" the ques-
tion whether to admit facts or opinions relating to the declarant's "testimonial
qualities," but does not mention rules that bar supporting and direct opinions
addressing whether someone is telling the truth on a particular occasion. See
Swift, Foundation Fact Approach, supra note 7, at 1379 & n.126.
121. For example, if a cohort in a criminal venture implicates the accused
in a station house affidavit that says he saw what the defendant did, and the
cohort later refuses to testify at trial, the prosecutor could offer the affidavit
through an "identification witness" who knows the declarant. See id. at 1413.
On the basis of similar foundation evidence, an investigative report could be
admitted if the officer was dead or otherwise unavailable. See id. at 1417.
122. Doing so would probably exclude some hearsay that presently gets in,
since it would add requirements not presently found in some exceptions. That
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not even be necessary to graft foundation fact requirements to
all the existing exceptions,i2 3 although amendments would be
needed for the exceptions covering present sense impressions,
excited utterances, medical statements, dying declarations, dec-
larations against interest, and public records, among others.
B. LIERALiZE HEARSAY Docrim-E IN CiVIL CASES
Park suggests that the hearsay doctrine should speak sepa-
rately to the two sides of the docket, recommending "intersti-
tial changes," not "radical reform," in criminal cases and
"broader reform" in civil cases.' 24 Much of his argument for re-
taining existing doctrine in criminal cases25 is summarized in
the foregoing discussion, and his insights are valuable and often
new. His suggestion that hearsay doctrine should work differ-
ently in the two areas is not troublesome or startling. Other
rules draw this distinction expressly, and the special concern
over criminal cases is sometimes visible in the structure of the
Rules or behind the substance of hearsay and other provisions.
The proposed reform in civil cases would lead to admitting
more hearsay, and Park's argument mostly emphasizes the spe-
cial difficulties criminal cases present. It is less a positive claim
is not a bad outcome for anyone convinced that the present categorical excep-
tions sometimes err in what they admit. But this grafting approach would not,
by itself, admit hearsay that is presently excluded. If the present exceptions
also err in what they exclude, grafting a foundation fact requirement to the
current exceptions will not cure the problem. Most people who criticize the
present exceptions as being both overbroad and underbroad hope to admit
more hearsay, and the grafting approach seems more" likely to admit less.
123. Swift would exempt several categories from the requirement, and
some exceptions already embody much of what she seeks. Admissions under
Rule 801(d)(2)(A)-(C) would be exempt, as would former testimony under
Rule 804(b)(1), and Swift would permit judicial notice of foundation facts un-
derlying five minor public record provisions. See Swift, Foundation Fact Ap-
proach, supra note 7, at 1409-13. In addition, the treatment of prior statements
by testifying witnesses under Rule 801(d)(1), the exceptions for past recollec-
tion recorded in Rule 803(5), and business records in Rule 803(6) could con-
tinue unchanged without doing violence to her proposal. See id. at 1395-98.
124. Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 7, at 106, 109. Like the de-
scription of the Swift proposal, what follows is an attempt to appraise Park's
approach, not examine every aspect or small detail. Inevitably, implications
will go unmentioned and there is a risk of distortion and incompleteness.
125. Park does not argue that the existing doctrine in criminal cases re-
quires no work. He tentatively suggests extending the requirement of unavail-
ability to statements "directly accusing the defendant of a crime," developing
carefully tailored treatment for custodial statements by accomplices, and fol-
lowing Michael Graham's suggestion to seek remedies for witness intimidation.
See GRAHAM, supra note 70, at 263-80; Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra
note 7, at 107-08.
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that civil litigants would benefit from admission of more hear-
say than a negative claim that there is less excuse to keep evi-
dence out in civil cases.1 6 The strongest claim emerging from
the argument is that civil discovery coupled with a notice
scheme for hearsay would remove the element of surprise, and
in civil cases jurors can understand and take into account bias,
financial interests, and institutional loyalties that color remote
statements and in-court testimony. By comparison, discovery in
criminal cases is limited and the pressures that bear on people
who give remote statements in that setting are less understood
and more difficult to unravel.
Park's proposed reform would introduce for civil cases a
rule of preference coupled with a notice-and-counternotice pro-
cedure.'2 A party could give notice of intent to offer hearsay,
and by counternotice the adversary could demand production of
the declarant instead. The proponent would then be obliged to
produce the declarant or demonstrate that she is unavailable.
In either case, her hearsay statement would be admissible, re-
gardless whether it satisfies criteria of reliability. 28 Standard
exceptions would remain, however, and either party could in-
voke them without going through the notice-and-counternotice
procedure.
This Park proposal is similar to the system the Model Code
of Evidence would have introduced across the board, and is eas-
ier to describe than the Swift proposal because it builds on cur-
rent doctrine.
In civil cases, Park's proposal would clearly pave the way
for out-of-court statements by testifying witnesses, which would
be admitted under standard exceptions or through the notice
procedure if the adversary required production of the declar-
ant. Indeed, the Park proposal would pave the way for all re-
mote statements, subject only to the requirement of producing
an available declarant if the adverse party demands it.'2'
126. Park emphasizes that in criminal cases (1) the Confrontation Clause
blocks "drastic liberalization," (2) process-based concerns surround statements
by accomplices and informers and testimony by police, and would surround re-
mote statements by defendants and victims admitted in an abolitionist regime,
(3) the problem of surprise is large because discovery is limited and not easily
expanded, and (4) the hearsay rule restrains state power, insuring that each
trial reaches a unique determination of guilt (rather than being a "show trial")
and preserving the "independence of the decisionmaker." Park, Subject Mat-
ter Approach, supra note 7, at 88-104.
127. Id at 117-18.
128. Id at 120.
129. Like all liberalizing reforms, the Park proposal raises the question of
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There are some obvious strengths in this proposal. First,
the notice-and-counternotice provision would replace the catch-
all exceptions, but courts would probably find it easier to ad-
minister than the existing catchall exceptions. The provision
would produce less uneasiness over judicial discretion and less
doctrinal complexity. Congress made the existing catchall pro-
visions unintelligible in an effort to curb their use and quell
fears over judicial discretion. The provisions have produced at
least one recognizable "common law exception' 30 and prece-
dents that courts find hard to apply or understand.
Second, combining the notice-and-counternotice procedure
with categorical exceptions should satisfy objections by practi-
tioners that free admissibility makes trial preparation hard, but
avoids introducing an untoward burden on proponents to give
pretrial notice of every item of hearsay. The proposal is a com-
promise between overly rigid notice requirements and a free-
for-all at trial. It is hard to predict how the notice procedure
will work in practice. The assumption is that most of the hear-
say any lawyer would want to offer already satisfies a categori-
cal exception, so the notice procedure would be a residual
feature, and I think it would probably work that way. While
the notice procedure may become the bully on the block, with
unforeseen and undesirable consequences, 131 it seems impor-
tant not to succumb to a Chicken-Little mentality.
how many unimagined statements lawyers will decide to offer under a new
regime.
130. The exception embraces grand jury testimony by unavailable wit-
nesses, which is often admitted against the accused under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 804(b)(5), although not always. Cases upholding this use of the catchall
provision include United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 652-654 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618, 622-625 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
305 (1990); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 7-8 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1814 (1990); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 956-957 (7th Cir. 1989).
Cases disapproving the same use include United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d
976, 980-83 (l1th Cir.), cert. dismissed by Recarey v. United States, 110 S. Ct.
2201 (1990); United States v. Snyder, 872 F.2d 1351, 1354-55 (7th Cir. 1989).
131. Lawyers who think categorical rules insure predictability might con-
fess they never know whether remote statements will get in, and might sooner
list everything in pretrial notice than take a chance on an unfavorable trial
ruling. Faced with long lists of hearsay, the adverse party might sooner de-
mand production of a declarant, either to make things difficult for the propo-
nent or to be sure there is someone to cross-examine, or both. Faced with a
demand for a declarant the proponent prefers not to produce, one option is to
do nothing and hope a categorical exception applies after all, and the adver-
sary then calls "foul" because he thought his demand would result in exclu-
sion of the statement or production of the declarant. Another option is to seek
a pretrial ruling that a noticed statement fits a categorical exception, but trial
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The real question raised by the Park proposal is whether
all statements by unavailable declarants should be admitted in
civil cases, and on this point I remain doubtful. Park is right
that unseen forces in the larger setting of criminal cases proba-
bly affect motivations and purposes of remote declarants in
ways more serious and harder to evaluate than those that affect
declarants in the larger setting of civil cases. But other hearsay
risks appear in civil cases that are very hard to assess. Evalua-
tive statements are an obvious example. Consider employer-
generated accident reports, police investigations of a collision,
and a doctor's diagnoses of ailments or injuries, all of which are
often admitted under standard exceptions but sometimes ex-
cluded as untrustworthy.132 In these and similar cases, unseen
forces pushing the declarant one way or another may be part of
the problem, but even more important are questions about
sources, adequacy of underlying data, risks of technical mis-
takes for which lay factfinders may have no "feel," or impon-
derable questions about declarant's purpose (was it to say what
he had been told or to convey his own firm view?).
IV. THE MYSTERY AT THE CENTER: HOW MUCH IS
ASSERTED IN WHAT SOMEONE SAYS?
During a drug raid a police officer answers defendant's
phone, and the caller asks, "Can I pick up the stuff?." Hearsay
when offered to prove the defendant deals drugs? Police arrest
one defendant and then his apparent colleague comes along,
courts dislike deciding such things beforehand and usually try to leave them
open.
For unavailable declarants, courts might permit resort to the notice proce-
dure at trial, where the dynamic insures unsympathetic treatment of the ad-
versary's claim that he did not expect this hearsay and wants time to prepare.
Of course this tension already exists with the catchall exceptions.
To the extent the notice procedure becomes the basis for admitting re-
mote oral statements, disparities between what the notice says and what the
evidence shows will generate predictable fights over adequacy of notice. In the
end, however, my view is that only Chicken Little would refuse the Park pro-
posal on these grounds, and the arguments are best understood as cautions
rather than unanswerable objections.
132. See, e.g., Faries v. Atlas Truck Body Mfg. Co., 797 F.2d 619, 622-23 (8th
Cir. 1986) (finding that in hearing a product liability claim against a truck
maker, the trial court erred in admitting the police report stating that the
plaintiff was speeding); Petrocelli v. Gallison, 679 F.2d 286, 289 (1st Cir. 1982)
(finding that in hearing a malpractice suit, the court properly excluded a doc-
tor's record containing a technical diagnosis); Campbell v. Nordco Prods., 629
F.2d 1258, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that in hearing a wrongful death suit
against a lift maker, the court properly excluded the employer's report
describing the lift's condition).
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and the first assures the second, "I didn't tell them anything
about you." Hearsay when offered to implicate the second in
the crime? In an apartment at 600 Wilshire is found an eviction
notice addressed to Carlos Almaden. Hearsay when offered to
prove he lives there?1a
In these and many other cases, the words are assertive by
any measure, but do not say directly that the event occurred or
the condition exists. Nevertheless they support the familiar
two-step inference, indirectly suggesting what is on the
speaker's mind, which in turn suggests indirectly that the event
occurred or the condition exists. In these "indirect use" cases,
the hearsay doctrine is hard to apply and the performance of
courts is mixed.
The difficulty lies close to the center of the doctrine, so it is
an embarrassment. One response of academic commentators,
who devote lots of energy to the problem, is to say it is not im-
portant as a practical matter, which at least tends to minimize
the embarrassment. But the problem is not small, and it shows
no promise of going away.
Some commentators trace the problem to the way the gen-
eral principle is framed. They argue that some definitions focus
more on the speaker and some focus more on his statement,z3
and that the former are broader and better serve hearsay con-
cerns than the latter. Professors Michael Graham and Olin
Wellborn seem to take this view. They propose revisions broad-
ening Rule 801's definition of hearsay, attempting to embrace
every statement offered in support of the two-step inference.'1
133. Innumerable cases say the first example (an incoming phone call ask-
ing about drugs) is not hearsay. Recent examples include United States v.
Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572,
1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990); and United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th
Cir. 1990). The second example tracks United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99,
104 (3d Cir. 1983) (hearsay). The eviction notice to Carlos Almaden is based
on United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982) (not hearsay),
rev'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883
(1986). Police are frequently lied to about the whereabouts or activities of a
cohort or relative, and courts generally treat such evidence as not hearsay,
under the guidance of a decision by the Supreme Court concluding that evi-
dence that cohorts gave perjured testimony to disguise a crime was not hear-
say. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-22 (1974).
134. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 355-56 (2d ed. 1982); Roger C. Park, McCormick on Evi-
dence and the Concept of Hearsay, 65 MInN. L. REv. 423, 425 (1981).
135. Graham proposes expanding the definition to reach a statement of-
fered to prove "declarant's belief in the truth or falsity of the matter as-
serted." 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE 117
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However, Professor Seidelson rightly points out that the fram-
ers of the Federal Rules thought that the declarant's expressive
intent was the key to proper application of the hearsay doc-
trine.13 6 Seidelson suggests that the federal definition may be
broader than some have supposed, 3 7 and Roger Park concludes
that the provision should not be amended.13S Professors Martin
and Saltzburg suggest a rule of thumb that helps resolve some
problems,139 and Professor Milich proposes more elaborate
tests. 14° Professor Bacigal suggests that the key is not in re-
(1989). Wellborn proposes expanding the definition to reach a statement of-
fered "as evidence of declarant's belief in a matter, to prove the matter be-
lieved." Olin Guy Wellborn, III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 61 TEx. L. REv. 49, 92 (1982) (proposing to define statement
as "an oral or written verbal expression" or "nonverbal conduct" that the ac-
tor intends as "a communication").
136. David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence
801: A Quandary for Federal Courts, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 741, 744-45, 760 (1986).
137. 1d. at 760-63, 775 (expressing doubt that courts applying Rule 801 will
interpret declarant's communicative intent with appropriate breadth to char-
acterize such statements as hearsay).
138. Roger C. Park, 'T Didn't Tell Them Anything About You'" Implied
Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV.
783, 784 (1990).
139. 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MIcHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 137 (5th ed. 1990) (if one fact "must be being asserted" in
order to take as true a statement directly asserting a different fact, the state-
ment is hearsay if offered to prove the former; if the statement may be true
when the fact to be proved is not, the statement may still be hearsay if declar-
ant "intended to assert" it, and the situation is more difficult to interpret).
140. See Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay Under the Federal Rules:
Some Method for the Madness, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 893, 910, 920 (1991) (sug-
gesting a two-part test to decide whether declarant intended to communicate a
point, turning on (1) what fact the statement is offered to prove and (2)
whether declarant would be "necessarily lying or mistaken" if we knew the
fact to be false, in which case the statement is hearsay; also suggesting a three-
part test for statements offered to prove declarant's state of mind, under
which a statement is nonhearsay only if (1) independent evidence supports the
truth of all or the relevant part of the statement, (2) the evidence is "incontro-
vertibly true," and (3) the statement is still relevant and not "merely cumula-
tive").
The first of Milich's tests appears to rest on his view that a person who
intends to deceive someone will "make some effort to convey the false infor-
mation with enough clarity and credibility that it will be understood and...
accepted as true." Id. at 909. But it seems as likely that deceivers convey very
little "false information," and the proposed test seems likely to treat as
nonhearsay much that should be embraced by the doctrine.
The second of Milich's proposed tests is a reasonable approximation of the
wise approach taken in cases like Bridges v. State, 19 N.W.2d 529, 535 (Wis.
1945) (admitting child's description of a room as proof that she had been
there), and United States v. Muscato, 534 F. Supp. 969, 974-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(admitting description of gun, as proof that declarant had seen it).
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fined tests or rules, but in recognizing the importance of cross-
examination.' 41
The indirect use cases resist tests and definitional revisions
for two reasons. First, modern hearsay doctrine requires us to
distinguish between saying and doing. It reaches assertions but
not nonassertive conduct, even when the latter is offered for
the famous two-step inference that brings hearsay risks.' 42 One
consequence is that the underlying rationale extends (at least
appears to extend) further than the doctrine's reach, and evi-
dence that might benefit from applying the trial safeguards
(particularly cross-examination) gets through untouched.143
Another consequence is that modern doctrine sometimes seems
to invite a line that cannot be drawn.14 4 Words have both
performative and assertive aspects, as all recognize in the ex-
ample of "I'm alive" offered to prove that the declarant was
alive. It follows that sometimes words are both hearsay and
nonhearsay when offered for a single purpose. It is futile to
think otherwise, and yet the profession seems unable to face
this difficulty.145
141. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Implied Hearsay: Defusing the Battle Line be-
tween Pragmatism and Theory, 11 S. Ia. U. L.J. 1127, 1144-45 (1987).
142. The first step is an inference from conduct to the actor's belief that
some act or event occurred or some condition existed, and the second is an in-
ference from belief to the act, event, or condition itself. It is understood that
these inferences introduce risks of misperception, faulty memory, and ambigu-
ity (three of the four hearsay risks). Because any act might be intended to ex-
press or communicate some point, there is also a risk, often very small, of lack
of candor. At least one commentator believes trial courts cannot intelligently
decide whether or not conduct is assertive. See Finman, supra note 19, at 696-
97, 707 (concluding that "implied assertions should be classified as hearsay").
143. I think modem doctrine is sound in reaching only assertions, because
words and word substitutes are more vulnerable to hearsay risks than nonas-
sertive conduct, which does not raise the problem of candor. Its ambiguities
differ from verbal ambiguities, and they are, I think, less dangerous. They re-
semble the ambiguities that circumstantial evidence often brings, and apprais-
ing them involves the factfinder in a task much like the one that comes with
deciding a case on its merits. See Michael H. Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay'"
A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U.
ILL. L. REV. 887, 909 (arguing that the framers of Rule 801 were correct in
finding that nonverbal, nonassertive conduct presents a low "candor risk").
144. At other times drawing the required line is easy. Words are always, or
almost always, assertive. Wordless conduct usually seems nonassertive and is
treated that way, or is obviously assertive (for example, shaking the head
"no") and is treated that way.
145. As I develop below, words always have performative aspects, but it
does not follow that they are always both hearsay and nonhearsay, which
would mean that the doctrine is radically incoherent. It is, I think, relatively
seldom that words in their performative aspect tend to prove something im-
portant in the case.
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Second, the subjective intent of the declarant is both criti-
cal and deeply problematic. On the one hand, hearsay's central
concern is intentionally expressive or communicative behav-
ior.1 46 The preference for live testimony would make no sense
if courts decided to admit or exclude out-of-court statements by
treating them as things with intrinsic meaning severed from
their human sources. There is no escaping that intent is critical
in appraising meaning because of the nature of language. On
the other hand, the intent standard makes sense only if inter-
preted in a way that is somewhat broad and artificial. For in-
stance, the statement "he took the car to work" must be
understood as intentionally communicating not only who took
the car and where it is, but also that there is a car and that he
has a job. The speaker might well tell us he meant to say only
who took the car and where it is. Nevertheless, the additional
points (that there is a car and that the one who took it works),
seem so close to this purpose, and so likely to have been on the
speaker's conscious mind, that they should be viewed as part of
his expressive purpose.
Even with this much guidance, however, it is hard to say
how far intent goes as a doctrinal matter or how far it extends
in any particular case.147 It is common in life that speaking
suggests things the speaker did not intend (his understanding
of the world and experience in it), and nobody can be sure how
much of what a listener hears in a statement was included in
what the speaker intended to express or communicate, or even
how much was in his conscious thoughts. Here at the margins
doctrine offers little guidance.
Let me elaborate on these two basic points. Conventional
doctrine recognizes that words sometimes have performative
aspects that are embraced by a few discreet categories of
nonhearsay, such as verbal acts and effect on listener.148 I
146. Only an "assertion" can be hearsay under the Federal Rules. See FED.
R. EvmD. 801(a)-(c). Common usage tends to equate assertion with communica-
tion. I prefer to speak in terms of expression or communication because the
latter conveys the idea of reaching listener or reader (which is unnecessary)
and the former focuses appropriately on the heart of hearsay concerns, which
is expressing ideas or information in language (words or word substitutes).
147. In one sense it helps to know we mean intentionally expressive or
communicative behavior (even though intent seems inherent in these con-
cepts) because that tells us to interpret a statement as saying what declarant
meant and not to get stuck on plain or literal meaning. It also helps that the
proposed evidential use may require that a statement be understood as inten-
tionally expressing the point to be proved (so it must be hearsay or nothing).
148. See LILLY, supra note 17, § 6.2.
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think they always have performative aspects, and in everyday
life we understand this point perfectly well as a matter of com-
mon experience. 149 What is this "performative aspect"? Proba-
bly it cannot be captured easily in a testing definition because
it is many things. At least part of it is that words provide the
means by which we shape our relationships, make common ar-
rangements, buy and sell things, set events in motion, protect
ourselves, attack or protect others, and focus attention to guide
or distract others. Words can be and often are effective in these
capacities, whether or not they create "enforceable" rights or
obligations.150 And these descriptions do not exhaust the
performative possibilities of language.
Why, if this claim has any merit, has it gone so long unno-
ticed as a matter of hearsay law? I offer four suggestions.
First, I think our professional culture is so steeped in verbal
meaning, in the reading of statutes, contracts and appellate
opinions, and in the multi-part tests the Court develops in ap-
plying the Constitution, that lawyers (including professors and
judges) dissociate common experience from hearsay analysis.
Second, I think the doctrine frightens professional people as a
thing of complexity, subtlety, and blinding effect. Lawyers and
judges focus on the assertive qualities of statements and search
for exceptions that might apply, sometimes overlooking the
performative aspects and the possibility that statements can be
both hearsay and nonhearsay when offered for a single pur-
pose. Third, I do not believe courts and lawyers are completely
oblivious to the suggestions advanced here, and in the academy
149. Spouses, for instance, know that words of consideration, criticism,
frankness, or evasion are important, not only in what they convey in verbal
meaning, but in the way they shape and constitute an ongoing relationship,
and in what they reflect about the unseen life of the speaker. Parents know
that what they tell children is important, not only in conveying information
and fostering understanding, but in expressing expectation, approval and
pride, which creates an environment in which the developing selfhood of the
child takes shape. Outside family settings, working people watchful of careers
and concerned over such matters as advancements and deadends, promotions
and layoffs, reassignments and shifting responsibilities, salaries and working
conditions know that what they say and what they hear affects them in ways
having nothing to do with verbal accuracy. And similar insights have long
been the stock-in-trade of Madison Avenue and political handlers, and are the
basis of arguments by modern feminists who want to censor pornography or
change the character of the workplace.
150. If friends arrange to meet at the theater, each understands that he has
invited the other's reliance, and both are likely to show up simply to "keep
their word." Failing to appear would likely cause inconvenience, require ex-
planation, and perhaps sow misunderstanding or mistrust. However, no one
would seriously consider "legal remedies" in this setting.
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people like Professor James Boyd White have developed the
thesis that words have meanings that transcend their assertive
aspect.15' I think courts and lawyers at least sense the possibil-
ity that something more than asserting happens in many cases
and they strain for reasons to conclude that statements are not
assertions, even when they obviously are, but they lack the pro-
fessional vocabulary to describe what they sense. Fourth, I
think the performative aspect of statements is usually not sig-
nificant enough to justify nonhearsay treatment, which makes
the failure to come to grips with this argument somewhat
understandable.
In part because the problem of indirect use of remote state-
ments is truly hard, courts sometimes cut through it by taking
extreme positions-adopting the narrow-gauge view that indi-
rect use never involves hearsay, or the overbroad view that it
always does. Neither view is right, and each comes from for-
malisms and sometimes misreading history.
There are at least three ways to reach the narrow-gauge
position that indirect use never involves hearsay. One invokes
a silly formalism that the term "assertion" does not include
questions and, perhaps, imperatives. 152 This oddity comes from
the dictionary and embodies the idea that "assertion" means a
strong claim that something is so. Taken where it leads, it
makes the last words Shakespeare gave Caesar nonhearsay evi-
dence that Brutus was among his assailants. This approach has
nothing to commend it-not common sense, nor history, nor
legislative intent nor policy.
The second way to reach the narrow-gauge position in-
volves the ancient formalism "implied assertion," which once
described all human behavior (both assertive and nonassertive)
when offered for the two-step inference. 153 Modern doctrine
151. See JAMES BOYD WmHTE, JusTicE AS TRANSLATION at xi-xii (1990)
(stating that "little of what happens in any real utterance is reducible to the
words uttered, .. . much lies in the gesture, in the relations between speaker
and auditor"; language may be imagined as "a kind of dance, a series of ges-
tures or performances, measured not so much by their truth-value as by their
appropriateness to context").
152. See United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
that an incoming call asking whether the "apples" had arrived was not hearsay
because an inquiry is not an assertion); United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572,
1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that telephoned inquiry asking whether Keith
"still had any stuff" that Mike could pick up was not hearsay because any
message conveyed by the questions was "merely incidental and not inten-
tional," and the questions were "nonassertive").
153. Baron Parke coined the term "implied assertion," and used it to de-
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does not treat nonassertive conduct as an "implied assertion"
and hearsay, so some courts wrongly conclude that nothing that
is an "implied assertion" can be hearsay and allow indirect uses
to escape.154
The third route to the narrow-gauge position begins with
misreading a comment by the Federal Rules of Evidence Advi-
sory Committee. The Committee said assertive verbal conduct
is not hearsay when offered to prove something other than the
matter asserted, and some courts therefore conclude that indi-
rect uses escape.1 55 The conclusion, however, is a non sequitur
because the Advisory Committee's comment does not even pur-
port to describe how broadly to construe "matter asserted."
Worse, the suggested reading is forced, assumes the framers
only dimly understood the subject, and ignores the larger
message that intent is the key.1
Oddly enough, the notion of "implied assertion" has also
scribe the letters to Marsden, offered to prove he was of sound mind because
his correspondents thought him so. More broadly, Parke applied the term
across the board to any indication that any human behavior provides about
acts, events or conditions, treating as hearsay all human conduct offered for
the two-step inference. But "implied assertion" is a singularly inept and artifi-
cial umbrella term. It requires us to understand "imply" in the weak sense of
"suggest" or "indicate," not in the usual strong sense of describing what a per-
son means to convey. It divorces "assertion" from normal usage, making it
mean essentially "evidence" and severing it from expressive or communicative
purpose.
If an ordinary letter is an implied assertion that its recipient is competent,
then an overcast sky is an implied assertion that rain is in the offing. Absent
an intent to express or communicate competence, it is no more illuminating to
describe a letter as an implied assertion of this point than it is to describe
clouds as implied assertions that it will rain.
154. See United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 465, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980)
(finding that incoming phone calls to alleged bookmaking premises stating "di-
rections for the placing of bets" were "nonassertive verbal conduct" offered as
proof of an "implied assertion" that cannot be hearsay under Rule 801). It is
one of history's ironies that a modern attempt to trim an overbroad argument
results in rejecting the entire argument, and that a formalism that once broad-
ened hearsay too much now narrows it too much.
155. See Long, 905 F.2d at 1579-80; Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 469.
156. The Advisory Committee stated that "verbal conduct which is asser-
tive" should be treated like nonassertive conduct-as nonhearsay-if "offered
as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted." FED. R.
EvID. 801(a) advisory committee's note. The most plausible interpretation of
this comment is that verbal utterances with significant performative aspects
may be treated as nonhearsay. Reading it this way explains use of the term
"verbal conduct" in lieu of more conventional terms like "assertion" (used
elsewhere in the same Note), and explains why the Committee likened "verbal
conduct" to nonassertive conduct-in both cases the performative aspect is
primary.
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been drafted in support of the overbroad view that verbal be-
havior is always hearsay. While the modem doctrine does not
embrace an "implied assertion" read into nonassertive conduct,
Rule 801 still gives courts enough room to conclude that it em-
braces every "implied assertion" found in verbal behavior. In a
difficult pre-Rules case that could be decided the same way to-
day, one court resorted to this overbroad notion in concluding
that the behavior of conspirators in planning a cover-up for
murder was hearsay when offered to prove an arrested member
of the group did the deed, even though nobody actually said so,
directly or indirectly.157
As a critic who rejects these extreme positions and doubts
the problem can be solved by tests or redefinitions, I owe it to
anyone who has read this far to say what I think we should do.
First, we need to think about hearsay in a new way, to recog-
nize that it is radically incomplete as a scheme for analyzing
what people say because it focuses on statements in their asser-
tive aspect, not on statements in their performative aspect.
When performative and assertive aspects both support the
point to be proved, conventional understanding of hearsay be-
comes incoherent, because it asks us to classify a statement as
either hearsay or nonhearsay when it is both.
The eviction notice to Carlos Almaden at 600 Wilshire
Drive'L makes the point. The landlord does assert that Alma-
den lives there, but describing the notice as an assertion cap-
tures only a piece of what is going on, as the reviewing court
clearly sensed but did not quite know how to say in concluding
that it was not hearsay. In its performative aspect, the notice
commences eviction (begins to throw the fellow out), so a court
that stops at the conclusion that the notice is an assertion is ex-
cluding both an assertion and an action reflecting belief, hence
the fact believed-claiming for the hearsay doctrine more than
its due. The phone calls inquiring after drugs' 59 or trying to
place bets are similar in nature, since they are not only asser-
tions that the callers want drugs and understand from prior
157. See United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1115-18 (2d Cir.) (holding
that a planning session, in which conspirators discussed a killing after the
arrest of the alleged murderer and planned to dispatch a second member of
the group to Florida to hide out, evidenced an "implied assertion" that the ar-
rested person did the deed), cert denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
158. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 710 F.2d 431
(8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
159. See supra notes 133, 152.
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dealings that drugs are to be had, but are attempts to purchase
drugs at the number dialed. In each situation, a lawyer would
be reasonable to ask for a chance to cross-examine, but we
crossed that bridge in excluding nonassertive conduct from the
coverage of the hearsay doctrine.
Second, recognizing the performative aspect of a statement
does not allow an end-run around the hearsay doctrine. Often
this aspect is trivial or does not support the desired conclusion,
so it does not count in favor of admitting the evidence. The let-
ters from Walters to his sister and fiance, for example, should
be viewed as hearsay when offered to prove any and all of the
points important in the Hillmon case' 60-his intent to go west
with Hillmon and the fact that he and Hillmon met and dis-
cussed the plan and agreed to go together, which in aggregate
support the inference that the two did set out together. Those
letters, of course, have performative aspects. By writing in an
apparently earnest and forthright vein, Walters tried to keep
up good relations with his sister and nourish his relationship
with his fiance. The letters in their performative aspect sup-
port the inference that Walters cared about these women in his
life, that he had cordial relations with them as well as prior
contacts and understandings. But to draw the inference that
Walters met Hillmon and intended to go west we must believe
what he said. I have suggested already that there is much rea-
son to do so, and a hearsay doctrine that found room to admit
these letters for all purposes would not be a bad thing, but the
point here is that the performative aspect would not suffice to
admit the letters to prove the points important in the Hillmon
case.
To look for a moment at a truly difficult case, consider
again the arrested defendant who tells his colleague, "I didn't
tell them anything about you." What are the performative as-
pects of these words? Surely they are a gesture of solidarity in
the face of difficulty. Perhaps they are an offer or commitment
of mutual cooperation-"I won't tell them what I know about
you if you won't tell them what you know about me." Viewed
in either light, these are performative statements whose proba-
tive value does not depend entirely on the truth of their verbal
content. Does such a gesture or offer support the inference
that the second fellow is guilty of the crime? I think it does,
although not strongly. It is possible that if the second man wasinnocent, the first would still feel the need to make the gesture
160. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
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or offer, as arrest spells trouble for innocent people as well as
guilty ones. Still, it seems far more likely that the first would
behave as he did if he thought the second was guilty of some-
thing. But probative worth seems marginal, and a court that
recognized these possibilities might exclude the utterance as
potentially misleading and confusing under Rule 403.
It would be possible to redefine hearsay to embrace all as-
sertive behavior offered for the two-step inference, or insist
that it rise or fall by qualifying or failing to qualify under stan-
dard exceptions. But doing so would once again claim more for
the doctrine than its due, and amounts to an attempt to shoe-
horn a three-dimensional reality that includes saying things,
doing things, and saying and doing things at once, into a two-
dimensional doctrine that contemplates only the saying or the
doing but not the two combined. It is wiser to add a dimension
to doctrine than to try to subtract one from reality.
Lastly, although this conclusion is only tentative, recogniz-
ing the performative aspect of statements may help dispose of
cases that can escape the hearsay doctrine only because the
point to be proved was apparently on the mind of the declarant
but not embraced by his expressive or communicative intent. If
the performative aspect of the statement, "I didn't tell them
anything about you," does not support an inference of guilt, all
that remains is the assertive aspect. It is possible to view the
statement as an intentional expression or communication of the
fact of guilt, and assume that the speaker momentarily forgot
the police were listening,1 61 or as a statement that reveals a
thought on his mind that he did not intend to express or com-
municate.1 62 Either way, viewing these assertive aspects of the
statement as critical to its evidential use makes it hearsay. In
the actual case, the court itself concluded that the statement
was hearsay, and this result is clearly defensible.
161. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 441-42 (1949) (finding
statement by one arrested woman to another, that "it would be better for us
two girls to take the blame than Kay" because "he couldn't stand to take it,"
was hearsay when offered to prove Kay's guilt because it "plainly implied" as
much).
162. In the case that produced this example, the court took this second ap-
proach. It said the statement was hearsay because offered to prove "an as-
sumed fact" (guilt of the colleague) that it "implied," and apparently the court
meant "imply" in the weak sense of suggesting, even though the declarant did
not intend to say as much. See United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 103 (3d
Cir. 1983).
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CONCLUSION
The promulgation of the Federal Rules did not put an end
to the talk about reforming hearsay doctrine, nor should it.
Modern reform movements attempted to simplify doctrine and
admit more hearsay. These movements emphasized the intelli-
gence of lay factfinders and challenged simple accounts that ex-
plain the doctrine by reference to the need for cross-
examination and explain the exceptions by reference to trust-
worthiness and necessity.
In the age of the Federal Rules, post-modern accounts rec-
ognize that the problem presented by hearsay is more compli-
cated, and the underlying concerns more numerous and
nuanced. The common sense of lay factfinders in conducting
the affairs of everyday life is not a compelling argument for ad-
mitting hearsay freely, and serious process-based concerns are
also at work. True accounts of hearsay also recognize the risks
of misreporting and fabrication, and the problems of surprise at
trial and broad judicial discretion. They also give weight to fac-
tors such as the likelihood that remote statements will be dis-
covered and investigated before trial and the reduction in
reporting risk that occurs when a statement is written. Post-
modern reform proposals should take into account the com-
plexity in underlying concerns. Both Swift's foundation fact
approach and Park's notice-based modified rule of preference
for civil cases do so. Both proposals merit serious
consideration.
The problem of indirect uses of remote statements lies at
the heart of hearsay doctrine. The problem is endemic, so long
as the hearsay doctrine applies to assertions but not nonasser-
tive conduct. A key to better understanding, and better resolu-
tion of the cases, is to recognize that statements often have
important assertive and performative aspects, and can be both
hearsay and nonhearsay when offered for a single purpose.
Treating them as nonhearsay seems reasonable only when the
performative aspect is significant.
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